Delva v. United States

Background

David Delva, who was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced by former District Judge Katherine B. Forrest to 360 months in prison, filed a motion without a lawyer under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. That statute allows a federal prisoner to challenge a sentence imposed in violation of federal law or the Constitution. Delva’s convictions included conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, conspiracy involving controlled substances, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The case involved evidence seized from Delva’s apartment during his arrest, including drugs, firearms, a cellphone, and letters addressed to his uncle, Gregory Accilien. The trial court denied Delva’s request to suppress the evidence. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s explanation of when some items were seized but affirmed because exigent circumstances—urgent circumstances that can justify a warrantless search or seizure—supported the seizures. The Supreme Court later declined to review that decision.

Claims about trial and appellate counsel

The court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington. Delva had to show both that his lawyers’ performance was seriously deficient and that the deficiency probably affected the outcome.

The court rejected Delva’s claim that trial counsel should have investigated and introduced a cellphone metadata report. Counsel instead stipulated that certain photographs were not taken by the cellphone’s camera. The court treated that as a reasonable strategic decision and found no prejudice because the relevant information was presented to the jury.

The court also rejected Delva’s claim that trial counsel should have challenged factual findings about when the cellphone and letters were seized. Although the Court of Appeals later disagreed with those factual findings, it still upheld the suppression ruling based on exigent circumstances. The court therefore found that any failure to object did not affect the case’s outcome.

The court found no ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to develop an argument against exigent circumstances. It reasoned that the government had not initially relied on that justification and that the Court of Appeals later found sufficient evidence of exigent circumstances. The court likewise rejected the claim concerning independent DNA testing of a latex glove because counsel had retained an expert, no sample was available for defense retesting, and the defense presented the information Delva said retesting would have shown. Finally, the court found that counsel’s decision not to call witnesses to contest the sexual assault testimony was a reasonable trial strategy because counsel instead argued that Delva was not present.

The court rejected Delva’s claims against appellate counsel. It concluded that counsel was not required to raise every possible argument. The court found no valid due-process argument based on the Court of Appeals’ use of exigent circumstances because an appellate court may affirm on a legal ground supported by the record even if the trial court did not rely on that ground. It also found it reasonable for appellate counsel to focus on the issues contested at trial. The court rejected Delva’s argument that Nelson v. Colorado barred consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing, noting that the Court of Appeals had rejected that interpretation.

Vagueness challenge

Delva argued that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was unconstitutionally vague, relying on Supreme Court decisions invalidating other statutory provisions involving definitions of crimes of violence. The court held that those decisions did not invalidate the part of § 924(c) used against Delva, which concerned possessing a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. The court therefore rejected the vagueness claim.

Claims based on Rehaif

Delva also sought to add claims based on Rehaif v. United States. In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant knew both that he possessed the firearm and that he belonged to a category of people barred from possessing one.

The court rejected Delva’s claim that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to challenge the indictment because it did not allege that Delva knew he had previously been convicted of a felony. The court found that Delva had not shown prejudice from the alleged omission or from counsel’s failure to raise the issue.

Delva also argued that his § 922(g) conviction was invalid because the trial jury was not required to find that he knew he was a felon. Because he had not raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal, he had to overcome procedural default by showing cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence. The court found that he satisfied neither requirement. Delva had stipulated that he was a felon, had an extensive criminal history, and had prior convictions punishable by more than one year in prison. The court concluded that these facts left no reasonable doubt that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. It also found that Delva’s own unsupported affidavit claiming he did not know he was a felon was insufficient to establish actual innocence.

Disposition

Judge Jesse M. Furman denied Delva’s motion in its entirety. The court did not issue a certificate of appealability because Delva had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied. It also denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees, finding that any appeal would not be taken in good faith. The court directed the clerk to close the related civil case and terminate the listed docket entries.