McLeod v. Smith

Background

Judon McLeod, proceeding without a lawyer, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that Deputy Warden Hellen Smith, Commissioner Cynthia Brann, and Correction Officer Janet Williams violated his constitutional rights while he was detained at the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island by depriving him of the opportunity to attend the Jumu’ah service on November 10, 2017. The court had previously dismissed the claims against Smith and Brann for failure to allege their personal involvement. The remaining matter was Williams’s motion for summary judgment.

Jumu’ah services were usually held on Fridays between 1:00 p.m. and 1:20 p.m. On November 10, the facility, including McLeod’s housing area, was on lockdown from 8:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. During lockdowns, detained people generally could not move around the facility. The tour commander nevertheless authorized a Jumu’ah service, and the record indicated that all housing areas were notified at 1:20 p.m. that the service would take place.

McLeod did not attend. He said he did not hear an announcement and specifically contended that Williams failed to announce the service to his housing area. But he also testified that, before the service, he asked a correction officer whether he could attend and was told he could not because of the lockdown. The court stated that the record did not clearly establish which explanation accounted for his absence. McLeod filed grievances, but he said he did not receive a hearing or decision before his transfer to state custody in January 2018.

Legal standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view disputed facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion, but unsupported conclusory assertions are insufficient to require a trial.

The court treated McLeod’s claims as arising under the First Amendment’s protection for religious exercise and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, or RLUIPA. For both claims, the court applied the requirement that the challenged conduct substantially burden the prisoner’s sincerely held religious beliefs. A substantial burden means more than an inconvenience and generally involves substantial pressure to change behavior or violate religious beliefs. Under the First Amendment, a prison official may avoid liability if the restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate prison-management interest. Under RLUIPA, the government must meet a more demanding standard if a substantial burden is shown.

Court’s analysis

The court assumed that McLeod’s Muslim beliefs were sincerely held because Williams did not contest that point. It then held that McLeod’s inability to attend one Jumu’ah service did not substantially burden his religious practice. The court relied on decisions holding that missing one, or in some circumstances two, religious services is not enough to establish a substantial burden. McLeod did not allege or provide evidence that he was denied other services, prevented from practicing other aspects of his religion, or affected by a systematic policy of denying religious services at the facility.

The court concluded that this failure defeated both the First Amendment and RLUIPA claims. It also gave an alternative reason for ruling for Williams: even if missing the service had been a substantial burden, the lockdown had a valid connection to the legitimate objective of maintaining the safety of detained people and staff. McLeod did not show that the lockdown or the usual restriction on movement during lockdown was irrational.

The court further found no evidence that Williams knowingly or intentionally prevented McLeod from attending the service. The absence could have resulted from confusion, miscommunication, an oversight, or negligence. The court stated that negligent interference with religious practice was not actionable for damages under either the First Amendment or RLUIPA on this record.

Disposition

Judge Ronnie Abrams granted Williams’s motion for summary judgment, directed the Clerk to enter judgment in Williams’s favor, terminated the motion, and closed the case. Because the court found no substantial burden, it did not address Williams’s arguments concerning exhaustion or qualified immunity.