Kornotzki v. Jawad

Background

Tariq Jawad asserted counterclaims against Eberhard Kornotzki under the federal Stored Communications Act, the Pennsylvania Wiretapping Act, and state tort law. Jawad alleged that Kornotzki, who had provided back-office, translation, email, and web-related services while working as an independent contractor, repeatedly accessed Jawad’s email account without authorization. Jawad also alleged that Kornotzki repeatedly turned Jawad’s email access off and on, prevented access to archived email and data, and used information obtained from the account to serve Jawad with the complaint in this case.

Jawad further alleged that he disclosed Kornotzki’s conduct to third parties with whom Jawad was doing or pursuing business, after which several third parties suspended or canceled business with Jawad. Kornotzki moved under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a pleading does not allege enough facts to state a legally plausible claim.

Stored Communications Act and Pennsylvania Wiretapping Act

The court held that Jawad plausibly alleged violations of both statutes. The Stored Communications Act prohibits intentional, unauthorized access to a facility providing electronic communications, or access exceeding authorization, when the conduct obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to communications in electronic storage. The court inferred that Jawad’s emails were stored on servers maintained by a third-party service provider because the allegations referred to archived email and data and did not indicate that the messages were stored only on local computers.

The court rejected Kornotzki’s argument that he was protected as the provider of the email service. Although Kornotzki administered Bridge’s domain name system, the allegations did not show that he provided electronic communication services through his own servers. The court also rejected the argument that Kornotzki was authorized to access the emails like an employer. The allegations described Kornotzki as an independent contractor, and the court noted that the employer-related authority recognized in other cases involved company-administered systems or company servers.

The court therefore denied Kornotzki’s motion to dismiss Jawad’s Stored Communications Act and Pennsylvania Wiretapping Act counterclaims.

Invasion of Privacy

Jawad alleged invasion of privacy through intrusion upon seclusion under Pennsylvania law. That claim requires an intentional and substantial intrusion into private matters that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, along with a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court held that Jawad adequately pleaded this claim by alleging that Kornotzki accessed Jawad’s email without authorization, read messages about business projects, disrupted Jawad’s access to his account, and tracked Jawad’s movements to serve him with legal papers. The court rejected Kornotzki’s arguments that he was authorized to access the emails and that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in work email. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss the invasion-of-privacy counterclaim.

Tortious Interference with Business Relations

Jawad brought this claim under New York law. One required element was that Kornotzki’s activities be directed at the third parties with whom Jawad had business relationships. The court found that the counterclaim did not meet that requirement. According to the allegations, Kornotzki’s conduct was directed at Jawad himself, while Jawad—not Kornotzki—disclosed the conduct to the relevant third parties.

The court therefore granted Kornotzki’s motion to dismiss Jawad’s tortious-interference counterclaim. The court also denied leave to amend that claim. It explained that Jawad did not request leave to amend the tortious-interference claim, did not indicate that he possessed facts that would cure the identified problems, and had previously been given an opportunity to amend with a warning that he would not receive another opportunity.

Disposition

Judge Jesse M. Furman granted Kornotzki’s motion to dismiss as to Jawad’s tortious-interference claim and denied it as to Jawad’s remaining counterclaims. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motion.