Snead v. Lobianco

Background

Lisa Snead sued the City of New York, Police Officers Gregory LoBianco and Richard Hanson, Sergeant Asa Barnes, and seven unnamed defendants. She alleged that defendants violated the federal Constitution and New York City law during a June 24, 2015 stop and arrest and during the resulting state criminal proceedings.

The officers believed Snead possessed an open alcoholic beverage. Officer LoBianco arrested her, and she was held at a precinct for about eighteen hours. LoBianco later signed a criminal complaint stating that he had seen Snead drinking from an open alcoholic beverage container. Snead was charged with resisting arrest, consuming alcohol in a public place, and disorderly conduct. The state court dismissed all charges on September 21, 2016.

Snead’s amended complaint asserted claims for unlawful stop and search, false arrest, malicious prosecution, denial of a fair trial based on fabricated evidence, failure to intervene, municipal liability, supervisory liability, and bias-based profiling. The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment, a procedure used to ask the court to resolve claims without a trial when no genuine dispute of important fact exists.

Snead voluntarily discontinued her evidence-fabrication claims against Barnes and Hanson, her malicious-prosecution claim against Hanson, and her municipal-liability claim. The court stated that those claims were dismissed with prejudice.

Fabrication-of-Evidence Claim

Snead sought summary judgment on her claim that LoBianco fabricated evidence by stating in the criminal complaint that he saw her drinking from an open can. The court applied a five-part test for a constitutional fair-trial claim based on fabricated information: an investigating official must fabricate information likely to influence a jury, provide it to prosecutors, and cause the plaintiff to lose life, liberty, or property.

The court found no genuine dispute that LoBianco was an investigating official, that his statement was untruthful, and that he sent the information to prosecutors by signing the complaint. LoBianco testified that he did not see Snead drinking from the can and did not know why he signed a statement under penalty of perjury saying that he had.

The court nevertheless denied Snead’s motion. Under the New York City open-container law, a person could violate the law by either consuming alcohol or possessing an open container with intent to consume it. The officers testified that they saw Snead with an open container, while Snead’s evidence did not establish as a matter of law that she did not possess alcohol. Because a jury could convict based on possession alone, the court could not determine that the fabricated statement was likely to influence the verdict.

The court also found that Snead had experienced a loss of liberty through her arrest, overnight detention, and required court appearances. But it could not decide on summary judgment whether LoBianco’s statement caused that loss. A jury could find that she would have been charged anyway based on evidence of possession, or could find that the statement affected the prosecutor’s charging decision.

Unlawful-Search Claim

Hanson and Barnes sought summary judgment on Snead’s unlawful-search claim, arguing that she had not been searched. The court denied their motion because the record contained conflicting evidence. LoBianco testified that Snead was searched at the precinct, Hanson testified that she likely was searched, and Snead’s testimony addressed only whether she had been searched before being placed in the police vehicle or cell. The court concluded that whether a search occurred was a factual issue for a jury.

Unlawful-Stop and False-Arrest Claims

Hanson and Barnes argued that they were not personally involved in Snead’s stop or arrest. The court denied summary judgment because testimony from the officers and a witness could support a finding that all three officers participated. The testimony indicated that all three officers observed Snead, approached her, and helped place her into custody. The court stated that a jury would decide whether their involvement was sufficient for liability under the federal civil-rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Failure-to-Intervene Claim

The court denied Hanson’s and Barnes’s motion on Snead’s failure-to-intervene claim. Police officers may be liable for failing to stop another officer’s constitutional violation when they had a realistic opportunity to intervene and did not take reasonable steps to do so. Because the officers were allegedly near Snead during the stop and arrest, and their involvement was disputed, the court held that a jury could find that they had such an opportunity.

Supervisory-Liability Claim

Barnes sought summary judgment on Snead’s supervisory-liability claim. The court explained that a supervisor cannot be held liable merely because another officer allegedly violated the Constitution. The plaintiff must show the supervisor’s personal involvement, such as direct participation, deliberately indifferent supervision, or another recognized basis.

The court denied Barnes’s motion. The evidence, viewed in Snead’s favor, could support a finding that Barnes directly participated in the events because he was present, approached Snead, and helped arrest her.

Bias-Based-Profiling Claim

Snead also brought a claim under New York City’s bias-based-profiling law. The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that claim. Snead relied primarily on the allegation in her complaint that the officers acted because of her race or color, but she offered virtually no supporting evidence. The court held that this conclusory allegation was insufficient to create a factual dispute for trial.

Disposition

The court denied Snead’s motion for partial summary judgment. It granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. The court identified the following claims as surviving summary judgment: fabrication of evidence against defendants other than Hanson and Barnes; unlawful search; unlawful stop; false arrest; failure to intervene; malicious prosecution against defendants other than Hanson; and supervisory liability. The court ordered the parties to submit proposed trial dates, a pretrial briefing schedule, and an estimated trial length.