Dibiase v. United States

Background

Paul DiBiase moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a statute allowing a federal prisoner to ask the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence. He challenged his 324-month sentence, which included a 15-year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Supreme Court later held in Johnson v. United States that one ACCA provision was unconstitutionally vague.

DiBiase had pleaded guilty under an agreement that waived his right to appeal, bring a collateral challenge—including a motion under § 2255—or seek a sentence modification for a sentence within or below the stipulated Sentencing Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months. The agreement identified three prior convictions as violent felonies. During the plea hearing, DiBiase admitted those convictions, and the court informed him that the firearm-possession count carried a 15-year mandatory minimum under the ACCA.

Before sentencing, DiBiase objected that his Texas burglary conviction did not qualify as an ACCA violent felony. After the court explained that pursuing the objection could be treated by the government as a breach of the plea agreement, DiBiase withdrew the objection. The court later imposed a total sentence of 324 months.

DiBiase’s Arguments

DiBiase argued that the collateral-attack waiver did not apply because his sentence was illegal, because the law had changed after his sentencing, and because his lawyer, Jeffrey Chartier, provided ineffective assistance during plea negotiations and sentencing. He claimed that counsel failed to investigate whether his prior convictions qualified as ACCA predicates.

The court explained that appeal and collateral-attack waivers are generally enforceable, but recognized exceptions when the waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and competent; when the sentence rested on constitutionally impermissible factors; when the government breached the plea agreement; or when the sentencing court failed to provide any rationale for the sentence. The court also explained that a waiver does not bar a challenge to the validity of the process used to obtain the waiver, including a claim that ineffective assistance made the plea agreement invalid.

Court’s Analysis

The court rejected DiBiase’s argument that Johnson automatically invalidated the waiver. It relied on Second Circuit precedent holding that a waiver remained presumptively valid when a sentence complied with the plea agreement, even when the defendant later argued that an ACCA-enhanced sentence was improperly calculated after Johnson.

The court also rejected DiBiase’s argument that the sentencing court’s failure to analyze his prior convictions made the waiver invalid. DiBiase did not identify authority showing that this argument fit within one of the recognized exceptions to enforcement of the waiver.

The court considered DiBiase’s ineffective-assistance claim despite the waiver because the claim challenged the process by which the plea agreement and waiver were obtained. Applying the rule that counsel’s performance must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, the court concluded that DiBiase had not presented a plausible claim. At the time of the plea, Second Circuit precedent treated burglary as a crime inherently involving a risk of personal injury. The court therefore found no indication that a more detailed analysis of DiBiase’s prior convictions would have produced a viable argument, and held that counsel’s decision not to pursue a fruitless investigation was not ineffective assistance.

Disposition

The court denied DiBiase’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence and denied his alternative request for an evidentiary hearing. The opinion does not change the sentence imposed in the criminal case.