Ward v. Cultural Care, Inc.

Background

Rachel Ward sued Cultural Care, Inc. and Sarah Briggs, identified as a Cultural Care employee and the head of its au pair program during the relevant period. Ward alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law, along with negligence. The allegations concerned Cultural Care’s handling of au pair services after Ward’s son was diagnosed with Type I diabetes.

Ward and Cultural Care entered into an agreement on January 19, 2018, to extend the au pair’s term. The agreement stated that Massachusetts law would govern and that the parties consented to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of Massachusetts courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts for claims arising from their relationship or between the parties, whether related to the agreement or not.

The defendants moved to dismiss or, alternatively, to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The court addressed the transfer request and did not decide the defendants’ alternative request for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Forum-Selection Clause

The court applied federal law to determine the effect of the forum-selection clause and used Massachusetts law for interpretive questions about the clause. It applied a four-part framework: whether the clause was reasonably communicated, whether it was mandatory, whether it covered the claims and parties, and whether enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust.

The court found the clause presumptively enforceable. It was communicated to Ward in the written agreement, and its reference to the “exclusive jurisdiction and venue” of Massachusetts courts made it mandatory. The court also concluded that the clause covered Ward’s claims because they arose from the relationship between Ward and Cultural Care. It held that Briggs was covered as well because she was sufficiently closely related to Cultural Care that it was foreseeable she would be subject to the clause.

The court then considered whether Ward had overcome the presumption of enforceability. Ward did not argue that the clause resulted from fraud or overreaching or that Massachusetts law was fundamentally unfair. The court also rejected her arguments that Massachusetts would provide inadequate remedies or that litigating there would be so difficult and inconvenient that she would effectively lose her opportunity to present her case. The court noted that the Massachusetts federal court regularly handles claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act and could apply New York law if necessary. The court did not decide whether New York law would govern Ward’s other claims.

Transfer Under Section 1404(a)

Because the clause was valid and enforceable, the court gave it controlling weight in the transfer analysis. Ward therefore had to show that public-interest considerations overwhelmingly disfavored transfer. The court found that she did not meet that burden. It rejected her arguments concerning local interest and noted that the case was not based on diversity jurisdiction, so there was no relevant interest in trying it in a forum especially familiar with the governing law.

Disposition

The court GRANTED the defendants’ motion to transfer and directed the Clerk of Court to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The opinion did not resolve the merits of Ward’s discrimination or negligence claims.