Boshnack v. Widow Jane Distilleries LLC

Background

Marc Boshnack filed a proposed class action against Widow Jane Distilleries LLC, which sells Widow Jane bourbon. He alleged that the company’s labeling violated New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350, which address deceptive business practices and misleading advertising. He also asserted claims for unjust enrichment, breach of express warranty, and fraud.

Boshnack alleged that the labeling was misleading in three ways: it suggested that the bourbon was distilled in New York; it suggested that limestone mineral water from New York was used in the bourbon’s distillation; and it falsely stated that the water came from the Widow Jane Mine. He alleged that he bought a bottle in January 2018 for approximately $85.

The pre-2018 label described the product as “Kentucky Bourbon Whiskey” and stated, “Pure Limestone Mineral Water From the Widow Jane Mine - Rosendale, NY.” The bourbon had been distilled in Kentucky using Kentucky water. Limestone water was added after distillation, when the bourbon arrived in New York for bottling. The water came from a nearby source rather than the Widow Jane Mine itself.

Legal Standard

Widow Jane moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court accepted factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences for Boshnack, but it did not accept conclusory statements without supporting facts.

For the New York consumer-protection claims, Boshnack had to plausibly allege that the labeling was likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in a material way and that he suffered injury. The court considered the labels as a whole, including their wording and any qualifying language.

New York General Business Law Claims

The court rejected Boshnack’s theory that the labels suggested the bourbon was distilled in New York. The pre-update label expressly called the product “Kentucky Bourbon Whiskey,” so a reasonable consumer would not understand it to have been distilled in New York.

The court also rejected the theory that the label suggested New York limestone water had been used during distillation. The label did not say that the water was used for distillation. The complaint itself acknowledged that the bourbon contained limestone mineral water from New York and was bottled in New York.

The court agreed that the statement that the water came from the Widow Jane Mine was misleading because the water came from a nearby source. But it held that the complaint did not plausibly allege that this difference was material—that is, important to a reasonable consumer. The complaint described the addition of the water after distillation as “meaningless and inconsequential” and did not explain why the precise source of the water would matter. The court therefore concluded that Boshnack had not stated a claim under Sections 349 or 350.

Common-Law Claims

The court held that the common-law claims also failed because they lacked required elements. A fraud claim requires justifiable reliance on a misrepresentation. An unjust-enrichment claim requires circumstances making it unfair for the defendant to retain the money. The court found that Boshnack had not plausibly alleged either element because the labeling was not materially misleading.

For breach of express warranty, Boshnack alleged that Widow Jane warranted that the bourbon was made in New York and that it used water from the Widow Jane Mine. The court found that the complaint acknowledged the product was bottled in New York, not that it was distilled there, and that the label did not represent that it was distilled in New York. The court also found that Boshnack had not plausibly alleged that water from the Widow Jane Mine itself was part of the basis of the bargain. His assertion that he would not have purchased the bourbon without that representation was insufficient.

Disposition

Judge Denise Cote granted the defendant’s December 13, 2019 motion to dismiss. The Clerk of Court was directed to enter judgment for the defendant and close the action. The court noted that it did not need to reach the defendant’s additional dismissal arguments. It also noted that the complaint did not plausibly allege a likelihood that Boshnack would be harmed again, which would have been necessary for injunctive relief, but that observation was not the stated basis for the ruling.