Mattel, Inc. v. Betterlover

Background

Mattel brought claims for copyright and trademark infringement involving its Barbie marks and works. It alleged that defendants sold counterfeit Barbie products through web-based platforms, including Wish.com. BUYBEAUTYPRODUCTS was alleged to be one of the sellers.

Kevin A. McLean sent the court a notice of appearance, answer, counterclaim, and cross-claim. The Clerk’s Office accepted those filings and listed McLean as a party, although he was not named or mentioned in Mattel’s complaint. Mattel later presented documentary evidence that BUYBEAUTYPRODUCTS was the name used by International Antidomestic Global Cloud Cyber Vanity Distribution Inc. (IAGCCVDI), a corporation organized under British Columbia law, and that McLean was IAGCCVDI’s chief executive officer.

Earlier Court Orders and the Motion

The court had previously denied, without prejudice, McLean’s effort to substitute himself for BUYBEAUTYPRODUCTS. The court later ordered McLean to identify businesses with which he had been affiliated, explain his relationship with IAGCCVDI and businesses using the BuyBeautyProducts name, identify entities in the Buy Beauty Group of Business Associations and Charitable Entities, and identify the sole proprietor of the BuyBeautyProducts names. The order warned that failure to comply would result in striking pleadings, motions, or applications submitted by McLean or by BuyBeautyProducts.

Mattel moved under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to strike McLean’s submissions. Mattel relied in part on a British Columbia court pleading stating that IAGCCVDI did business as BUY BEAUTY PRODUCTS and that McLean was its chief executive officer and chairman. Mattel also submitted a British Columbia corporate-registry summary identifying McLean as IAGCCVDI’s chief executive officer and stating that IAGCCVDI was not in liquidation.

McLean repeatedly asserted that IAGCCVDI had been dissolved and that BUYBEAUTYPRODUCTS was his sole proprietorship. The court found those submissions conclusory and unsupported by relevant documentary evidence. It also stated that McLean had not provided an order or documentation showing that a registrar had struck IAGCCVDI. The court applied a presumption that an established state of affairs continues until the contrary is shown.

Court’s Analysis

The court stated that, even if Mattel had sued the corporation under a trade name, the claim could remain viable against the corporation that held the name when the action began. The court therefore directed Mattel to amend its pleading to name the entity as a defendant.

The court held that a corporation is an artificial entity that may appear in federal court only through an attorney admitted to practice in that court. It noted that a sole proprietorship is different because it has no legal existence separate from its owner, but concluded that McLean had failed to establish that BUYBEAUTYPRODUCTS was a sole proprietorship.

The court further explained that transferring a corporation’s trade name to an individual would not make the individual a party to an action that began with the corporation as the relevant defendant. The parties are determined as of the time the plaintiff filed the action.

Disposition

Judge P. Castel granted Mattel’s motion to strike. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion and strike the specified submissions from the docket, including documents 49–51, 59–61, 63–66, 69, 71–77, 80, 85–87, 89–93, 97, 99–104, 106–108, and 132–137.

Within 21 days, Mattel was ordered to amend the caption and body of its complaint to identify the corporation against which its claim was asserted when the action began. The court stated that any corporation named could appear only through an attorney admitted to practice in the court.