Sanderson v. Leg Apparel LLC
- Gregory Woods
- 1:19-cv-08423
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 23
In Aftern Sanderson v. Leg Apparel, Judge Woods mostly denied the defendants’ dismissal motion but dismissed two inadequately pleaded claims.
Aftern Sanderson and the defendants, including Leg Apparel LLC, Amiee Lynn Accessories, Inc., Steven H. Spolansky, Melissa Romanino, and Stuart Diamond. The ruling allowed several employment-discrimination and individual-liability claims to continue but dismissed the gender-based hostile-work-environment and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims, subject to repleading.
What happened
In Aftern Sanderson v. Leg Apparel LLC, Aftern Sanderson alleged that his employers assigned him more work than white coworkers, made comments about his perceived sexual orientation, and fired him two days after he complained to Human Resources.
The defendants asked the court to dismiss several discrimination, hostile-work-environment, individual-liability, and emotional-distress claims. The court found that Sanderson had adequately alleged race discrimination, sexual-orientation and sex discrimination based on an adverse employment action, race-based hostile work environment, and individual liability under New York law.
Judge Gregory H. Woods granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. He dismissed the gender-based hostile-work-environment and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims, while allowing Sanderson to replead them within twenty-one days; the remaining claims could continue.
The detailed version
- Sanderson v. Leg Apparel LLC · No. 1:19-cv-08423
- Gregory Woods
- June 11, 2020
Background
Aftern Sanderson, who is Black, worked for Leg Apparel and its subsidiary, Amiee Lynn Accessories, Inc., as a senior planner for about two years and eight months. He alleged that he was assigned a disproportionately heavy workload compared with white coworkers and that coworkers made racially insensitive comments. He also alleged that coworkers and supervisor Melissa Romanino made comments suggesting that he was in a same-sex relationship, including asking whether client contacts were his “boyfriend.”
Sanderson complained to Human Resources about the comments, his workload, and related workplace treatment. Two days later, he was fired. He alleged that Stuart Diamond told him the termination was “in the best interest of the company,” and that Diamond later admitted the company retaliated against him for complaining about discrimination. Sanderson pursued administrative complaints before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the New York State Division of Human Rights before filing this federal case.
Claims and Motion
Sanderson’s amended complaint asserted claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The claims included race and sex discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, aiding and abetting, and individual liability. Because Sanderson was representing himself, the court also construed the amended complaint and his opposition as asserting a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under New York law.
The defendants moved to dismiss several claims, but they did not move to dismiss Sanderson’s retaliation claims. On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asks whether they plausibly support a legal claim. The court also considered factual allegations in Sanderson’s opposition because he was representing himself.
Race Discrimination
The court held that Sanderson plausibly alleged race-discrimination claims under federal, state, and city law. Although his initial administrative complaints did not allege race discrimination, the New York State Division of Human Rights later issued a probable-cause determination stating that its investigation found evidence supporting an inference of discrimination based on race and perceived sexual orientation. The court therefore concluded that administrative exhaustion did not bar the race claims.
The court found that Sanderson’s allegation of a disproportionately heavy workload compared with white coworkers was enough at the pleading stage to support an adverse employment action and an inference of discriminatory motivation. The court also allowed his race-based hostile-work-environment claims to proceed. It considered the workload allegation together with the alleged racially insensitive remarks, unequal praise, and coworkers’ alleged disruption of his calls.
Sex and Perceived Sexual-Orientation Discrimination
The court held that Sanderson plausibly alleged discrimination based on perceived sexual orientation under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. It rejected the defendants’ argument that Sanderson had to allege that he was not heterosexual. The court reasoned that, at the pleading stage, discrimination based on perceived sexual orientation could support a sex-discrimination claim.
The court found that Sanderson adequately alleged an adverse employment action because he was terminated shortly after Romanino made a disparaging comment about his perceived sexual orientation. However, it held that Sanderson’s gender-based hostile-work-environment claim was inadequately pleaded. The three alleged comments were offensive as alleged, but the court concluded that they were not sufficiently continuous or pervasive to create an objectively hostile work environment.
Individual Liability
The court allowed Sanderson’s individual-liability claims against Steven H. Spolansky and Melissa Romanino to proceed under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. It reasoned that Sanderson plausibly alleged that Spolansky, identified as Leg Apparel’s president, had authority to hire and fire employees. It also held that Sanderson plausibly alleged that Romanino could be individually liable based on her alleged participation in the conduct supporting the employer’s discrimination liability.
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The court dismissed Sanderson’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. It found that he had not alleged facts supporting either recognized theory: witnessing the death or serious injury of an immediate family member, or suffering emotional injury from a breach of a specific duty that endangered his physical safety or caused him to fear for it. The court also found no allegation of physical harm and concluded that the alleged workplace discrimination did not constitute the required special circumstances.
Disposition
Judge Gregory H. Woods granted the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. The court dismissed the gender-based hostile-work-environment and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims. It allowed Sanderson to replead those claims and required any amended complaint to be filed within twenty-one days. The court stated that if Sanderson did not replead, the remaining claims would continue.
Read the full 23-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.