Lara v. Keyser

Background

Jason Lara, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, petitioned for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After a jury convicted him in New York State court of second-degree burglary, the state court classified him as a “persistent violent felony offender” based on his 1995 and 2001 convictions for attempted second-degree robbery. The court imposed an indeterminate sentence of eighteen years to life.

Lara later challenged the use of his 2001 conviction as a predicate offense because the judge in that case had not advised him before accepting his guilty plea that the sentence would include mandatory post-release supervision. His sentence was changed several times during state-court proceedings. In 2018, however, the Appellate Division vacated the 2017 sentence and reinstated the original eighteen-years-to-life sentence. It also held that Lara’s challenge to the 2001 conviction was barred because he had not raised it at his 2012 sentencing, and that the sentence was not unconstitutionally severe. The New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.

The challenge to the 2001 conviction

The court denied Lara’s first claim for multiple reasons. First, under the Supreme Court’s rule concerning prior convictions used to enhance later sentences, a defendant generally may not use a federal habeas petition attacking the later sentence to challenge an older conviction that is no longer open to direct or collateral review. The court stated that the exception for a prior conviction obtained without appointed counsel did not apply because Lara had counsel during the 2001 proceedings. The court also explained that an ineffective-assistance claim does not fall within that exception.

The court separately considered whether Lara was challenging only the state court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing. It stated that federal habeas review generally is unavailable for such a challenge and concluded that the state court’s decision not to hold a hearing was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

The court also held that the Appellate Division had relied on an independent and adequate state-law ground: New York law barred a defendant from challenging a prior conviction used for enhanced sentencing when the defendant had failed to raise the challenge during the predicate-offender proceeding, absent good cause. Because that state procedural ruling independently supported the judgment, the federal court treated Lara’s claim as procedurally barred.

The Eighth Amendment claim

The court denied Lara’s claim that his eighteen-years-to-life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. It stated that an excessive-sentence claim ordinarily does not support federal habeas relief when the sentence falls within the range authorized by state law. The court found that New York law authorized an indeterminate sentence with a minimum term between sixteen and twenty-five years and a maximum term of life for a persistent violent offender, placing Lara’s sentence within the permitted range.

Lara argued that a severe teenage beating had impaired his thinking and reduced his moral responsibility, and that his offense was “burglary in name only.” The court concluded that these arguments did not show that the state court’s decision contradicted or unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law. It also stated that Lara’s effort to relitigate the severity of his sentence was not cognizable on federal habeas review.

Disposition

The court denied Lara’s habeas petition. Because Lara had not made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were denied, the court ruled that a certificate of appealability would not issue. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees. The clerk was directed to close the case and mail Lara a copy of the opinion and order.