Sumlin v. United States

Background

Corey Sumlin moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal procedure allowing a prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence imposed in violation of federal law or the Constitution. He filed the motion without a lawyer. The case concerned his guilty plea to possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and his related supervised-release violations.

Sumlin had previously pleaded guilty to the same firearm offense and served a 46-month prison sentence. After his release, he was arrested again while carrying a handgun. He later pleaded guilty to another § 922(g)(1) charge and to two supervised-release violations. During the plea hearing, the government described the required elements as knowing possession of a firearm, a prior conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, and a connection to interstate commerce. Sumlin stated that he possessed the firearm, had previously been convicted of a felony, and knew that his conduct was wrong and illegal.

After Sumlin’s plea but before his sentencing, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States. Rehaif held that, for a § 922(g) conviction, the government must prove that the defendant knew both that he possessed a firearm and that he belonged to the relevant category of people prohibited from possessing one.

Claims and analysis

Sumlin raised three principal claims:

1. The guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Sumlin argued that the plea hearing did not explain the Rehaif knowledge requirement and did not establish a factual basis showing that he knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. The court held that this claim was procedurally defaulted, meaning Sumlin generally could not raise it in a § 2255 motion because he had not raised it on direct appeal. The court found neither sufficient cause for the default and resulting prejudice nor actual innocence. It also concluded that the record strongly showed Sumlin knew of his prohibited status: he had previously pleaded guilty to the same offense, served a 46-month sentence, and admitted during the later plea hearing that he had previously been convicted of a felony and knew what he was doing was wrong and illegal.

2. Ineffective assistance of counsel. Sumlin argued that his lawyer should have filed a notice of appeal and should have advised him about the Rehaif knowledge requirement. The court rejected both arguments. It relied on the appeal waiver in Sumlin’s plea agreement, which barred a direct appeal or collateral challenge to a sentence within or below the agreed range of 46 to 57 months. The court also found that counsel was not required to predict Rehaif, because the decision changed the law after the plea. In addition, Sumlin could not show prejudice because the evidence indicated that he knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm and therefore could not plausibly show that better advice would have caused him to reject the plea and go to trial.

Sumlin’s supplemental filing added claims that counsel should have objected to the delay of a preliminary hearing and should have sought reconsideration of the denial of his suppression motion. The court found that these allegations did not establish constitutionally ineffective assistance.

3. Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Sumlin argued that the indictment failed to allege the required knowledge element and therefore did not charge a federal crime. The court rejected that argument, relying on Second Circuit precedent holding that the Rehaif knowledge requirement concerns the merits of the offense, not the court’s authority to hear the case. The court also stated that Sumlin’s separate grand-jury argument was waived by his guilty plea.

Disposition

Judge Sidney H. Stein denied Sumlin’s § 2255 motion in full. The court determined that the case records conclusively showed that Sumlin was not entitled to relief, so no hearing was required. The court also found that the supplemental motions did not affect the denial. It concluded that a certificate of appealability should not issue because Sumlin had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied, and it certified that an appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith.