Curran v. Keyser

Background

Justin Curran, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging state-court convictions for three counts of second-degree murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery, and fourth-degree grand larceny. The opinion states that he is serving an aggregate prison term of 25 years to life.

The original petition raised four grounds: that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the verdict conflicted with the weight of the evidence; that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that Curran had allegedly assaulted the mother of his children before the murder; that the court improperly admitted a graphic photograph of the victim; and that the court improperly gave a jury instruction about flight and consciousness of guilt.

Curran later sought a stay and abeyance—an order pausing the federal case while he exhausted a claim in state court. His proposed new claim alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to object to DNA evidence and failed to request a pretrial hearing under the Frye standard, which asks whether a scientific method has gained general acceptance in its field. Curran had filed a state-court motion under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10 raising those arguments.

Respondent’s Position

Respondent opposed the stay. Respondent argued that Curran had not shown good cause for failing to raise the claim earlier and that the proposed claim had no merit.

Court’s Analysis

The court first considered whether adding the new claim to the federal petition would be possible. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act imposes a one-year limitations period for federal habeas petitions. The court determined that Curran’s conviction became final on August 14, 2018, giving him until August 14, 2019, to file a habeas petition. He filed the original petition on May 6, 2019, but did not include the ineffective-assistance claim. The court stated that he first mentioned that claim in a September 2, 2019 declaration, after the limitations period had expired, and did not seek a stay until November 15, 2019. The court therefore concluded that the new claim was time-barred. It also stated that, based on the information before it, there were no grounds for equitable tolling.

The court next held that the new claim did not relate back to the original petition. Under the relation-back rule, an amendment may use the original filing date when it arises from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence described in the original pleading. The court found that Curran’s proposed claim concerned counsel’s handling of DNA evidence and the failure to request a Frye hearing, while the original claims concerned different trial evidence, a flight instruction, and the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. The supporting facts therefore differed in both time and type. Because the claim could not be added to the petition, granting a stay for the purpose of exhausting it would be futile.

The court also assumed, without deciding, that the stay standard from Rhines v. Weber applied even though the new claim was not part of a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Under that standard, a petitioner must show good cause for failing to exhaust the claim earlier, that the claim is not plainly meritless, and that the petitioner was not deliberately delaying the litigation.

The court found that Curran failed to show good cause. It rejected his reliance on a state decision questioning the Forensic Statistical Tool because the opinion states that Curran’s case used short tandem repeat DNA testing, not the Forensic Statistical Tool. The court also found that he failed to show that the proposed claim was potentially meritorious. It stated that short tandem repeat testing had gained general acceptance, that a separate Frye hearing was not required on the record presented, and that an objection or Frye-hearing request would have had little or no chance of success.

Disposition

The court denied Curran’s motion for a stay and abeyance. The order did not dismiss the original habeas petition or decide its four original grounds for relief.