Strusman v. NYU Langone Hospitals

Background

David Strusman brought religious-discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) against NYU Langone Hospitals and Charles Catanzaro, Beverly Tavares, and Kali Robinson in their individual and official capacities. The Title VII claims were brought only against NYU Langone. The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim, arguing that the NYCHRL claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The motion therefore also sought dismissal of all claims against the individual defendants.

Strusman alleged that he requested a Monday-to-Thursday schedule and an early Friday release so he could observe the Jewish Sabbath. He alleged that the requests were denied and that the defendants later terminated him in retaliation for requesting a religious accommodation.

Administrative Proceedings and Filing History

Strusman filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on September 15, 2016. The charge was automatically treated as also filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights under the agencies’ work-sharing agreement. The New York State Division of Human Rights dismissed the complaint on September 30, 2019, for administrative convenience. Strusman had filed the original federal complaint on October 11, 2019, and later filed an amended complaint asserting Title VII and NYCHRL claims. He abandoned his New York State Human Rights Law claims.

Issue

The parties agreed that the NYCHRL generally requires a civil action to be filed within three years after the alleged unlawful act. They also agreed that the most recent alleged discriminatory act occurred more than three years before Strusman filed his original complaint. The issue was whether the three-year period was paused while his complaint was pending before the state human-rights agency.

Court’s Analysis

The court read the NYCHRL as providing separate rules for the election of remedies and for tolling the limitations period. Generally, a person who files an administrative complaint cannot also bring the same claim in court. But Section 8-502(b) creates an exception when the state agency dismisses a complaint for administrative convenience, allowing the person to sue as if no administrative complaint had been filed.

The court concluded that the tolling rule appears in Section 8-502(d), which states that the three-year period is tolled while a complaint is pending before the state division and during any court proceeding reviewing its dismissal. The court found that this language was broad and did not exclude administrative-convenience dismissals.

The court also relied on Section 8-502(e), which expressly removes tolling when an administrative-convenience dismissal is caused by the complainant’s malfeasance, misfeasance, or recalcitrance. Because the law specifically identifies that exception, the court declined to create a broader exception based on Section 8-502(b). The court also noted that Strusman’s administrative dismissal was not based on those forms of misconduct.

The court distinguished the New York City law from the New York State Human Rights Law. The state law denies tolling in certain circumstances when a complainant asks to annul the administrative complaint, but the court found that the New York City law does not contain the same limitation. The court therefore held that Strusman’s NYCHRL claims received the benefit of tolling while his state administrative complaint was pending.

Disposition

Judge Lewis J. Liman denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the NYCHRL claims. The court directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion docket entry. The opinion did not decide whether Strusman ultimately proved religious discrimination or retaliation; it decided only that the NYCHRL claims were not barred by the limitations period at this stage.