Paloma v. New York City Department Of Corrections

Background

Miriahm Paloma brought this self-represented action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while she was a pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Rose M. Singer Center on Rikers Island. She sought money damages from the New York City Department of Corrections and Captain Daniels. In an earlier order, the court dismissed the claims against the Department because a New York City agency was not an entity that could be sued. The court also found that Paloma had not adequately pleaded claims concerning odors, a search, housing assignment, lost property, or handcuffing, but allowed her to amend limited claims concerning the search, housing assignment, and handcuffing.

In her amended complaint, Paloma named Daniels and four additional correction officers: Mullgrav, Folks, Speights, and Leak. She repeated allegations that she had been searched without use of the “Boss chair,” that her housing had been reassigned several times after a minor altercation with another inmate, that property went missing during the reassignments, that officials inadequately responded to poor living conditions, and that handcuffs bruised her left wrist. She also added claims that Leak failed to provide dinner on April 10, 2020, and that Mullgrav disclosed that she had a communicable disease requiring treatment without prior knowledge of her health or a physician’s consent.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the amended complaint did not cure the deficiencies identified in the earlier order. For the conditions-of-confinement claims, Paloma did not allege facts showing that any defendant was deliberately indifferent—that is, aware of and disregarded conditions posing a serious threat to her health or safety. Those claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

The court also dismissed the search claim because Paloma did not explain how or why the search occurred and did not allege facts suggesting intentional humiliation, abuse, invasive touching, or that the search lacked a reasonable connection to legitimate prison interests. The court dismissed the property claim because she did not show that available state remedies were inadequate or inappropriate. It dismissed the housing claim because she had no constitutional right to a particular housing unit or facility, and it dismissed the handcuffing claim because she alleged no facts showing excessive force.

The court dismissed the dinner and medical-disclosure claims because they exceeded the limited permission to amend the original lawsuit. The court therefore dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the statute governing screening of actions filed without prepaying fees, and directed the Clerk to terminate all other pending matters.

Disposition

Judge Louis L. Stanton dismissed the complaint. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.