Vail v. The City of New York

Background

Andrew Vail, acting without a lawyer, filed a Third Amended Complaint against the City of New York, the Department of Corrections, and several corrections officers. He alleged that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to repair a leaking toilet in his cell on Rikers Island for approximately one week. He alleged that insects were attracted to the leak, bit him, and caused him to need medical attention.

Magistrate Judge Sarah Cave construed the complaint as asserting two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, and the Fourteenth Amendment: a conditions-of-confinement claim based on the failure to repair the leak, and a medical-care claim based on the alleged failure to provide prompt treatment for the insect bites.

Report and Recommendation

Judge Cave recommended dismissal. She concluded that the alleged approximately one-week delay in processing a repair request, standing alone, did not show the required subjective intent for deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement. She also concluded that Vail did not state a medical-care claim because his injury was not critical and he received treatment within a day of requesting it.

The recommendation further concluded that Vail had not alleged a custom or policy that caused the constitutional violation, as required for municipal liability against the City defendants. After recommending dismissal of the federal claims, Judge Cave recommended that the court decline supplemental jurisdiction—its authority to hear related state-law claims—and dismiss those claims. She also recommended denying leave to amend because Vail had already filed four pleadings in the action.

Ruling

Because no party objected to the report and recommendation, Judge Valerie Caproni reviewed it for clear error and found none. Judge Caproni adopted the recommendation insofar as it dismissed Vail’s federal claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim. She dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice because the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The order explains that state-law claims must be dismissed without prejudice when supplemental jurisdiction is declined, even though the recommendation had described them as dismissed with prejudice.

The court also stated that Vail’s failure to object precluded appellate review. It certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without paying the appellate filing fee. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate pending deadlines and motions and close the case.