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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled July 6, 2020

Krupka v. TF Cornerstone, Inc.

Judge
Lorna Schofield
Docket
1:19-cv-11577
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
2
EmploymentArbitrationDiscoveryCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Krupka v. TF Cornerstone, Judge Schofield ordered limited discovery before any renewed arbitration motion concerning the circumstances of Krupka’s transfer.

Who this affects

Walter Krupka and the defendants, because the order required limited discovery and set deadlines for a possible renewed motion to compel arbitration.

What happened

In Krupka v. TF Cornerstone, Inc., Walter Krupka alleged that he faced a hostile and retaliatory work environment at a non-union property and was then transferred to a union property, where he was terminated in a discriminatory way.

The collective bargaining agreement prohibited discrimination but required employees to pursue discrimination claims through grievance and arbitration procedures instead of federal court. The court had previously denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration without prejudice and asked for more information about the agreement and Krupka’s transfer.

Judge Lorna G. Schofield ordered limited discovery about the circumstances of the transfer, to be completed within 30 days. The defendants may renew their motion to compel arbitration by August 19, 2020, and must address whether the arbitration requirement violates a clearly established public policy because of the alleged transfer circumstances.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Krupka v. TF Cornerstone, Inc. · No. 1:19-cv-11577
Judge
Lorna Schofield
Date
July 6, 2020

Background

The complaint alleges that Walter Krupka was subjected to a hostile and retaliatory work environment at a non-union property. It further alleges that he was transferred to a union property so that the defendants could terminate him while his employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement, and that he then faced a discriminatory termination.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or, alternatively, to compel arbitration. On May 22, 2020, the court directed the parties to attend a hearing and denied the motion without prejudice to renewal. After a June 4, 2020, telephone hearing, the court ordered additional briefing about the collective bargaining agreement.

Agreement and public-policy issue

The collective bargaining agreement contains a clause stating that there shall be no discrimination against any present or future employee. It also requires employees to bring discrimination claims through grievance and arbitration procedures rather than in federal court.

The court explained that a collective bargaining agreement may be unenforceable as applied to an individual if enforcement would violate public policy. The relevant public policy must be explicit, well-defined, and dominant, and must be based on positive law rather than general views about the public interest. Because the complaint alleges that Krupka was transferred to place him under the agreement and then terminate him, the court identified a potential issue concerning whether the arbitration provision could be unenforceable based on the circumstances of that transfer.

Order

The court ordered the parties to conduct limited discovery about the circumstances of Krupka’s transfer to the union building. That discovery had to be completed within 30 days of the order.

The defendants were permitted to renew their motion to compel arbitration by August 19, 2020. If they renewed it, they had to address whether the arbitration provision was unenforceable as against public policy because of the transfer circumstances, including any public policy against manipulating an individual employee’s employment to prevent access to federal courts. Krupka’s response was due September 2, 2020, and the defendants’ reply was due September 11, 2020.

The order did not decide whether arbitration would ultimately be compelled or whether the arbitration provision was unenforceable. It also stated that the order did not change the deadlines in the existing case-management and scheduling order.

The authoritative version

Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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