Robinson v. New York City Transit Authority

Background

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action alleging that the New York City Transit Authority’s policies and procedures for obtaining and enforcing default judgments against people charged with violating its Rules of Conduct violate the Due Process Clause. The Transit Adjudication Bureau adjudicates the notices of violation. If a person does not plead or appear, the Bureau may enter a default judgment, including fines and additional penalties. A person seeking a hearing on the underlying charge must first obtain a ruling that there was good cause to excuse the default.

The dispute concerned the Bureau’s written policy for deciding requests to vacate default judgments. Plaintiffs contended that the policy narrowly limited the circumstances in which a default judgment could be vacated. During a deposition, Supervising Attorney Melissa Brody testified that the written list of valid excuses was not exclusive and that hearing officers could consider additional circumstances case by case. Brody also testified that senior hearing officers reviewed hearing officers’ decisions to ensure that the relevant rules, policies, and evidence were considered.

The Discovery Requests

Defendants asked for a protective order barring plaintiffs from deposing senior hearing officers Anjelica Cappelino and Heather Widell and preventing plaintiffs from presenting testimony from former hearing officer Anthony Feldmesser. Defendants argued that absolute judicial immunity protected the officers from discovery concerning their adjudicatory functions. They also argued that plaintiffs disclosed Feldmesser too late, despite having worked with him for at least six months.

Plaintiffs argued that their questions for the senior hearing officers concerned administrative practices rather than judicial functions. They sought to ask whether hearing officers had discretion to depart from the written default policy. Plaintiffs also argued that defendants had waived any applicable immunity through Brody’s deposition and that Feldmesser was disclosed promptly after plaintiffs decided to rely on his testimony.

Ruling on the Senior Hearing Officers

Judge Barbara Moses held that the senior hearing officers’ review of individual decisions to vacate default judgments was adjudicatory work protected by absolute judicial immunity. The review involved determining whether hearing officers applied the governing rules and policies and considered the appropriate evidence, followed by approving or rejecting their decisions. The court explained that judicial immunity protects against discovery as well as liability for damages when the conduct at issue is judicial.

The court rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to characterize the requested testimony as concerning general policies and practices. The practices plaintiffs wanted to examine were the practices used when making substantive legal decisions in individual requests to vacate default judgments. The court also rejected the waiver argument, concluding that neither senior hearing officer had waived immunity and that NYCTA did not waive it merely by allowing Brody, who was not a hearing officer or senior hearing officer, to answer deposition questions.

Ruling on the Former Hearing Officer

The court also declined to permit plaintiffs to rely on Feldmesser’s testimony about TAB policies and practices. Under the federal discovery rules, parties must identify people likely to have discoverable information that they may use to support their claims or defenses and must timely update incomplete or incorrect disclosures. The court found that plaintiffs waited at least six months, and possibly longer, to disclose Feldmesser even though he had been cooperating with their counsel and plaintiffs had been warned that delaying disclosure could lead to exclusion.

Applying the factors used to decide whether late-disclosed testimony should be excluded, the court found that plaintiffs’ explanation and the importance of the proposed testimony weighed against them. Judicial immunity also limited the testimony Feldmesser could provide about how hearing officers interpreted and applied the default policy to individual requests. Although discovery could theoretically have been extended so defendants could depose Feldmesser, the court declined to extend the already-extended fact-discovery deadline under the circumstances.

Disposition

Judge Moses granted defendants’ letter-application. The order barred the requested deposition discovery from the senior hearing officers and declined to permit plaintiffs to rely on Feldmesser’s policy-and-practice testimony. The court stated that it would reconsider the ruling if defendants later sought to introduce evidence that hearing officers had discretion to vacate judgments for reasons beyond those listed in the written policy. The order resolved a discovery dispute and did not decide the merits of plaintiffs’ Due Process claims.