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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled July 9, 2020

Feibleman v. The Trustees of Columbia University In The City of New York

Judge
Valerie Caproni
Docket
1:19-cv-04327
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
16
Civil ProcedureMotion to DismissContract
In one sentence

In Feibleman v. Columbia, Judge Caproni denied leave to amend contract, estoppel, and Title IX claims as futile.

Who this affects

Ben Feibleman’s proposed claims against Columbia University could not be added to the case; Columbia prevailed on the motion to amend.

What happened

In Feibleman v. The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York, Ben Feibleman asked to amend his complaint after the court had dismissed certain claims against Columbia University. He sought to revive contract and promissory-estoppel claims and add a Title IX claim based on Columbia’s handling of his accusations against Jane Doe.

The court concluded that the proposed amendments did not fix the earlier problems. It found no enforceable promise to investigate Doe’s alleged retaliation, no clear promise or harmful reliance supporting estoppel, and no plausible Title IX claim because Columbia’s investigation was not clearly unreasonable and the alleged misconduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to deny Feibleman educational benefits.

Judge Valerie Caproni denied Feibleman’s motion to amend and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion from the docket.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Feibleman v. The Trustees of Columbia University In The City of New York · No. 1:19-cv-04327
Judge
Valerie Caproni
Date
July 9, 2020

Background

Ben Feibleman, who had been the respondent in a campus sexual-assault disciplinary matter, sought leave to file a proposed amended complaint against The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York. The motion followed the court’s earlier decision granting in part Columbia’s motion to dismiss. Feibleman attempted to revive contract and quasi-contract claims that had been dismissed for failure to allege an enforceable promise or damages. He also sought to add a Title IX deliberate-indifference claim based on Columbia’s alleged failure to investigate his accusations that Jane Doe sexually assaulted or harassed him and retaliated against him.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), courts generally should allow amendments when justice requires, but leave may be denied when the amendment would be futile. An amendment is futile if the proposed claims would still fail under the standard for dismissing a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court therefore accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true, subject to contradictions from the complaint’s other allegations, attached materials, or incorporated evidence, and considered whether the proposed claims were legally plausible.

Proposed Contract Claim

Feibleman argued that Columbia breached its obligations under its Gender-Based Misconduct Policy by failing to investigate Doe’s alleged retaliation. The court had previously held that he had not identified an enforceable promise or resulting damages, and it found that the proposed amendment did not cure either defect.

The policy stated that retaliation allegations between a complainant and respondent “may be investigated” through one of two disciplinary processes. Feibleman relied on nearby language stating that other retaliation allegations “will be investigated,” but the court concluded that the cited provisions addressed which process would apply after Columbia determined that an investigation was warranted. The court found that the policy’s separate investigation provisions gave Columbia significant discretion in deciding whether to begin an investigation. Because Feibleman had not identified an express promise requiring Columbia to investigate every complaint, the proposed breach-of-contract claim remained deficient.

The court also held that Feibleman had not plausibly alleged damages caused by the failure to investigate. He claimed that Doe’s alleged retaliation obscured the truth from classmates, harmed his reputation, and damaged his journalism career. The court concluded that those injuries stemmed from Doe’s accusation and Columbia’s disciplinary decisions, including its finding that Feibleman was responsible and its revocation of his degree, rather than from Doe’s alleged retaliation or Columbia’s failure to investigate it. The court therefore denied leave to add the proposed breach-of-contract claim.

Proposed Promissory-Estoppel Claim

Feibleman also sought to add a promissory-estoppel claim based on Columbia’s failure to complete its investigation within 60 days. Under New York law, promissory estoppel requires a clear and unambiguous promise, reasonable and foreseeable reliance, and injury caused by that reliance.

The court had previously found that the Gender-Based Misconduct Policy’s statement that Columbia would seek to resolve reports within approximately 60 days was aspirational and subject to exceptions. The proposed complaint continued to rely on that same language and did not identify a specific, non-aspirational promise applicable to Feibleman’s case. The court also rejected Feibleman’s reliance on an alleged assurance by Columbia investigator Serena Barnett that her report would be completed by the end of January. Even assuming that statement was a promise, Feibleman did not allege that he relied on it to his detriment. The court found that he had already decided to continue the academic term because of his prior investment in his education, and the proposed complaint did not plausibly connect the alleged delay to additional tuition or another injury caused by reliance on Barnett’s statement.

The court therefore denied leave to add the proposed promissory-estoppel claim.

Proposed Title IX Claim

Feibleman proposed a Title IX deliberate-indifference claim based on Columbia’s alleged failure to investigate his claims against Doe. For this type of claim, an educational institution must have actual knowledge of harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprives the student of educational opportunities or benefits. The institution’s response must also be clearly unreasonable in substance or timing.

The court held that the proposed claim was futile under both theories Feibleman advanced. First, Feibleman did not identify a particular witness interview or other investigative step that Columbia should have taken but did not. According to his own allegations, Columbia interviewed approximately a dozen witnesses and reviewed substantial multimedia evidence. The court also found that Columbia was not required by Title IX to treat the allegations as the most serious possible disciplinary charge, and that its decision not to classify the alleged conduct as sexual assault, domestic violence, or dating violence was not clearly unreasonable on the allegations presented.

The court further held that the alleged conduct did not meet Title IX’s severity and pervasiveness requirements. The alleged conduct included biting Feibleman’s lip, slapping him, grabbing his buttocks, pulling down his pants, and attempting to perform oral sex. The court concluded that these alleged events, considered alone or together, did not plausibly show that Doe’s conduct deprived Feibleman of access to Columbia’s educational opportunities. It also found no plausible causal connection between Doe’s alleged conduct and Feibleman’s claimed professional and educational losses, which the court attributed to Doe’s accusation and Columbia’s disciplinary punishment.

Second, the court rejected the proposed Title IX theory based on Doe’s alleged retaliation. Feibleman alleged that Doe spread a rumor that she had contracted a sexually transmitted disease from him and later spilled a drink on a witness. The court found no allegation that the rumor was widely circulated, continued over time, affected Feibleman’s education, or caused academic or professional harm. It also found no plausible educational injury from the spilled-drink incident, which occurred shortly before graduation. The alleged retaliation therefore was not sufficiently severe and pervasive to support a deliberate-indifference claim.

Disposition

The court denied Feibleman’s motion to amend. It did not grant leave to add the proposed breach-of-contract, promissory-estoppel, or Title IX claims, and it directed the Clerk of Court to terminate docket entry 98.

The authoritative version

Read the full 16-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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