Dov v. Bureau of Prisons

Background

Shayeh Dov, an inmate at Otisville Federal Correctional Institution, was serving an 87-month sentence after pleading guilty in the Southern District of Florida to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. He was 50 years old and had one kidney, diabetes, heart disease, and renal conditions. The opinion states that he recovered from COVID-19 in April 2020.

Dov filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking transfer to a proper medical facility or a furlough for medical treatment. He later filed a motion seeking release to home confinement until his condition stabilized, or, alternatively, transfer to a hospital. He reported pain, kidney and renal problems, and other medical concerns. The medical records showed regular visits with prison medical staff, consultations with specialists, medication changes, laboratory testing, and a renal ultrasound order. Dov also told the court that requests on Bureau of Prisons forms BP-8 and BP-9 had been denied, although those forms and denials were not submitted to the court.

Home confinement and compassionate release

The court denied Dov’s request that it recommend home confinement. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the Bureau of Prisons has discretion to designate a prisoner’s place of confinement, and statements from the sentencing court are among the factors the Bureau considers. The court explained that the sentencing court had already denied Dov’s request for the same relief.

The court also denied any request for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Such a request had to be made to the sentencing court, and Dov had already applied there and been denied relief.

Medical furlough

A medical furlough under 18 U.S.C. § 3622(a) allows the Bureau of Prisons, in its discretion, to release a prisoner temporarily to obtain medical treatment that is not otherwise available. The court held that the federal court could not order the Bureau to grant a furlough. It further found that Dov’s request was premature because the record indicated that additional steps remained in the Bureau’s administrative process.

The court nevertheless recommended that the Bureau consider whether a brief medical furlough to a hospital or home would be appropriate. The recommendation was not an order requiring the Bureau to grant temporary release.

Habeas claim and medical care

The court treated Dov’s challenge to the medical conditions of his confinement as a petition for habeas relief under § 2241. Federal prisoners generally must complete the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative-remedy process before seeking this relief, although a court may excuse that requirement when legitimate circumstances outside the prisoner’s control prevent completion or when delay creates a serious health or safety threat.

The court found that Dov had not shown that he completed the administrative process or established a reason to excuse that requirement. The court also considered the claim on its merits. To prove that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment through inadequate medical care, Dov had to show both a serious medical risk and deliberate indifference—meaning conscious disregard of that risk.

The court credited Dov’s assertions that his kidney, renal, and heart conditions were serious. It nevertheless found no deliberate indifference. The records showed that medical staff regularly monitored and treated him, including through specialist consultations, medications, testing, and examinations after his complaints of pain. The court concluded that Dov’s disagreement about the appropriate treatment did not establish a constitutional violation.

Disposition

The court denied the Petition and Motion. It specifically denied Dov’s application for habeas relief, denied his request for a home-confinement recommendation, and denied his request for compassionate release. The court recommended that the Bureau of Prisons consider temporary release for medical treatment and directed the Bureau’s counsel to promptly serve the opinion on the warden and chief counsel at Otisville. The clerk was directed to close the case.