Truitt v. Salisbury Bank and Trust Company

Background

William Gunnar Truitt sued Salisbury Bank and Trust Company and Salisbury Bancorp, Inc. under New York Labor Law § 201-d. That law prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an employee because of political activities outside work, including running for public office. Truitt alleged that the defendants retaliated against him and wrongfully terminated his employment after he announced that he would campaign for the New York State Assembly.

The Bank hired Truitt as a Mortgage Lending Officer trainee in February 2018. At the time, he was serving as a Dutchess County legislator, and the Bank knew about that role. After Truitt announced his Assembly campaign, Bank managers reviewed whether the campaign would conflict with his job. The Bank concluded that an Assembly position would require substantial time in Albany and could interfere with the demanding responsibilities of a mortgage lending officer. Management told Truitt that he needed to decide whether to pursue the Assembly campaign or continue working at the Bank.

On May 1, 2018, Truitt informed Bank employees that he would continue his Assembly campaign. He later maintained that he had been effectively forced to leave and had not submitted a formal resignation. The defendants characterized his departure as a resignation. Truitt also alleged that Arthur Bassin, who had supported the incumbent Assemblymember, influenced the Bank’s position, but the court found that the evidence did not create a material factual dispute about the Bank’s motivation.

Summary-Judgment Standard and Evidence

The defendants moved for summary judgment under Rule 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view the evidence favorably to the nonmoving party, but the nonmoving party must identify specific admissible evidence supporting a trial-worthy dispute.

Truitt did not submit the required response to the defendants’ numbered statement of facts under the Southern District of New York’s Local Rule 56.1. The court therefore treated the defendants’ supported factual statements as admitted, while also independently reviewing the record, including documents, declarations, and testimony.

Analysis

The court held that an adverse employment action is required for a claim under New York Labor Law § 201-d. An adverse employment action can include termination and constructive discharge. Constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign.

The court determined that Truitt’s departure was a resignation. The evidence showed that he considered whether to postpone his campaign, decided that he could not give up the opportunity to run, and informed the Bank that he would continue his campaign. The court found no evidence that the defendants told Truitt he would be fired regardless of his decision. Instead, the evidence showed that he was given a choice between continuing his Bank employment and pursuing the Assembly campaign, and that the Bank was willing to have him return if his campaign was unsuccessful.

The court also held that Truitt had not shown constructive discharge. His disagreement with the Bank’s position and his belief that he could perform both roles did not establish that the Bank deliberately created intolerable working conditions. Applying an objective standard, the court concluded that no rational juror could find that Truitt had been constructively discharged.

The court noted that, even assuming Truitt had shown a constructive discharge and established an initial claim based on Bassin’s alleged statements, summary judgment would still be appropriate. The defendants presented substantial evidence that their decision was based on management’s concern that Truitt could not handle both the mortgage-lending job and the campaign or potential Assembly position. Truitt did not provide sufficient evidence to create a material dispute about that explanation. The court did not resolve whether the burden-shifting framework proposed by the parties applied to this New York-law claim because Truitt’s claim failed for lack of a termination.

Disposition

Judge Nelson S. Roman granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed Truitt’s complaint, directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion at ECF No. 47, and ordered entry of judgment in favor of the defendants.