McCray v. Lee

Background

Lionel McCray brought a self-represented action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Superintendent William Lee, Sergeant Kutz, and Watch Commander Lieutenant Plimey. He alleged that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to maintain the grounds during winter and by denying him a meaningful opportunity for physical exercise at Green Haven Correctional Facility.

The court had previously denied McCray’s requests for volunteer counsel without prejudice. The court later dismissed his claims with prejudice, but the Second Circuit vacated that judgment in part. The appellate court reinstated McCray’s damages claim concerning denial of meaningful physical exercise and the related state-law claims, and directed the district court to address whether McCray intended to assert the exercise claim against Kutz. On July 14, 2020, McCray again requested appointed counsel. He cited his incarceration, alleged lack of access to legal documents, alleged retaliation by prison officials, difficulty moving the case forward and conducting discovery, and inability to afford a lawyer.

Legal standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a court may appoint counsel for an indigent party in a civil case, but there is no constitutional right to counsel in such cases. The court applied a two-step test. First, it considered whether McCray’s claims had some likelihood of merit. Second, after assuming that threshold was satisfied, it considered practical factors such as McCray’s ability to investigate facts, present the case, handle the legal issues, and obtain counsel.

Court’s analysis

The court assumed, for purposes of the application, that McCray’s claims met the initial likelihood-of-merit requirement. It nevertheless found that the practical factors did not justify appointing counsel. The court said McCray’s submissions were careful, relevant, and competent; lack of legal knowledge alone was insufficient; and he had not identified facts that could be investigated only with a lawyer’s assistance.

The court also found that the remaining claims were not too complex or unusual for McCray to handle, particularly because the prior decisions had narrowed and clarified the issues. The court recognized that incarceration and possible witness cross-examination could create obstacles, but said those circumstances alone did not warrant appointed counsel. Finally, the court emphasized that McCray’s renewed application identified no efforts to obtain counsel or legal assistance, which the court treated as determinative.

Disposition and additional directives

The court denied McCray’s application without prejudice and directed the Clerk to terminate the pending motion. It stated that McCray could renew the request if circumstances materially changed. Separately, the court gave McCray 30 days to amend his Second Amended Complaint to clarify whether he intended to assert the denial-of-exercise claim against Kutz and to state facts showing that claim was plausible. If he did not amend, the action would proceed only on the remaining claims. The court also directed the Clerk to update McCray’s address and mail him a copy of the order.