Brennan v. Hoehmann

Background

Matthew I. Brennan, proceeding without a lawyer, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Clarkstown; Town Supervisor George Hoehmann; Councilman Frank Borelli; Building Code Task Force Attorney Leslie Kahn; Zoning Board of Appeals Chairman Kevin Hobbs; and Code Enforcement Officer Raymond L. Francis. Brennan alleged that the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by interfering with his effort to convert his property from a single-family home to a multi-family home.

Brennan alleged that the Town had issued him a permit for a second kitchen and a certificate of occupancy for that kitchen and related interior alterations. He claimed the Town later classified the property under a state tax code for a single-family house with a year-round accessory apartment, while refusing to recognize that classification as allowing a multi-family home. He also challenged the Town’s rental registry, changes to building-code definitions, and alleged discriminatory efforts to keep Hasidic Jewish people from moving into Clarkstown.

After the Town issued building-code violation notices, Brennan applied to the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals for a use variance allowing him to rent the home to another family. The Zoning Board denied the application. Brennan then challenged that decision in a state-court proceeding, but the state court dismissed his petition and refused to vacate the Zoning Board’s decision. Separately, Brennan received a criminal summons concerning alleged building-code violations and stated that the related Town Court proceeding remained pending.

Motion and Jurisdictional Rulings

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim.

The court applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to Brennan’s claims concerning the denial of the use variance. That doctrine generally prevents a federal district court from reviewing a state-court judgment. The court found that Brennan had lost in state court, complained of injuries caused by that judgment, sought federal review and rejection of it, and that the state-court judgment predated this federal action. The court therefore dismissed all claims concerning injuries caused by the Zoning Board’s denial of the variance under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The court also applied Younger abstention to the building-code violations. Abstention is a doctrine under which a federal court declines to decide certain matters out of respect for ongoing state proceedings. The court found that Brennan was subject to an ongoing state criminal proceeding, that the proceeding involved the important state interest of local zoning, and that the Town Court provided an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. The court rejected Brennan’s assertion that the proceeding was intended to harass or intimidate him, finding those allegations conclusory. The court explained that Younger abstention applies to requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, but not ordinarily to claims for money damages. It nevertheless did not decide whether the damages claims should be stayed because it found other grounds for dismissing them.

Due Process Claims

The court dismissed Brennan’s substantive due process claims. Such a claim requires a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest and state action that is oppressive or so arbitrary that it amounts to a gross abuse of governmental authority. The court held that Brennan’s allegations about how the property was taxed did not meet that standard. It also held that he did not plausibly allege a legitimate entitlement to the requested use variance or show that the variance would have been granted without a due process violation.

The court separately dismissed Brennan’s procedural due process claims. A procedural due process claim requires a protected property interest and constitutionally inadequate procedures. The court held that Brennan could not plausibly claim an entitlement to use the property as a multi-family home because he did not allege that the property was zoned for multi-family use or had been used that way before the zoning restriction. The property had historically been zoned for single-family use, and Brennan’s request for a variance or change in zoning law did not establish a legal entitlement. The change in the property’s tax-code classification also did not establish such an entitlement.

Remaining Allegations and Disposition

The court dismissed any claims based on the alleged rental registry, changes to the definitions of senior housing and family, and the alleged discriminatory religious agenda because those allegations were conclusory and lacked factual support. The court also declined to address the defendants’ qualified-immunity arguments because it had already found that the complaint had to be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

The court denied leave to amend, concluding that amendment would be futile because the proposed claims would still lack jurisdiction or fail to satisfy the requirements for stating a claim. The motion to dismiss was GRANTED. The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith for purposes of obtaining permission to proceed without paying the appeal filing fee, directed the Clerk to terminate the motion, and closed the case.