GUITY v. SANTOS

Background

Nazim I. Guity alleged that he composed and held a copyright in a musical composition titled “Eres Mia.” He alleged that Anthony Santos, working with others, recorded another song titled “Eres Mia” that incorporated protected elements of Guity’s song, was substantially similar to it, and infringed the copyright.

In an earlier Opinion and Order, the court dismissed the copyright-infringement claims under Rule 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not plausibly state a legal claim. The court concluded that the two works were not substantially similar as a matter of law under either the reasonable-observer test or the more discerning-observer test.

Motion to Reconsider

Guity moved under Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He argued that the court had failed to consider “fragmented literal similarity”—the theory that copying a relatively small but qualitatively important part of a work can support a finding of substantial similarity.

The court accepted that such copying can, in appropriate circumstances, support substantial similarity. But it explained that identifying an identical fragment is only the beginning of the analysis. The question is whether the copied material is trivial or substantial. The court stated that it had already examined the songs both as a whole and through their individual elements, including the identical titles, common words and phrases, and the musical compositions. It concluded that the common elements were trivial, insubstantial, and insufficient to plausibly support copyright infringement. The court denied reconsideration.

Request to Amend

Guity alternatively sought to amend his complaint to expand and develop his infringement claims and theories. The court noted that Guity had previously been given an opportunity to amend by January 22, 2019, but did not file an amended complaint. The scheduling order also allowed him to amend as of right or move to amend by the later applicable deadline, including 21 days after the defendants’ motion to dismiss. He did not amend or seek leave to amend within that period and did not request amendment when opposing the motion to dismiss.

Under Rule 16(b)(4), a scheduling order may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent. The court found that Guity had not been diligent and had not shown good cause. It also found that the defendants would be prejudiced by having to file a third motion to dismiss in response to a late amended complaint. The court denied leave to amend.

Attorneys’ Fees

The defendants sought attorneys’ fees and costs under section 505 of the Copyright Act, which permits an award to a prevailing party. The court considered whether the claims were frivolous or objectively unreasonable, whether Guity had an improper motive, and whether compensation or deterrence was needed.

The court found that Guity’s claims were not objectively unreasonable or frivolous. It discerned no extraneous motive, bad litigation conduct, or untoward behavior requiring deterrence. The court also noted that the action had not proceeded beyond the motion-to-dismiss stage. It denied the defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees.

Disposition

The court denied Guity’s motion for reconsideration or, alternatively, to amend his complaint. It separately denied the defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and directed the Clerk to terminate the motions.