Scalercio-Isenberg v. Morgan Stanley

Background

Sherry Scalercio-Isenberg alleged that Morgan Stanley Services Group Inc. did not hire her because of her gender, age, and disability. She brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. She also brought a Title VII retaliation claim based on a theory she called “blackballing.” She dropped her state-law claims in the first amended complaint.

The court had previously granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss but allowed Scalercio-Isenberg to amend her complaint. She filed her first amended complaint on January 20, 2020. Defendants then moved again to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and asked that the dismissal be with prejudice.

Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege enough facts to make a claim for relief plausible, rather than relying only on legal conclusions or speculation. Because Scalercio-Isenberg represented herself, the court was required to read her complaint liberally, while still requiring factual allegations supporting each element of her claims.

Individual Defendants

The court held that Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act do not allow individual defendants to be held liable for alleged work-related discrimination. It therefore dismissed the claims against James Gorman, Jeff Brodosky, Matthew Dziedzic, and Kerrie Heslin in their individual capacities.

Gender and Age Discrimination

The court evaluated the gender and age discrimination claims under the burden-shifting framework used for employment discrimination claims. For a failure-to-hire claim, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that she belonged to a protected group, was qualified, was denied the job, and was denied the job under circumstances suggesting discrimination.

The court concluded that the amended complaint did not allege facts suggesting that Morgan Stanley’s decision not to hire Scalercio-Isenberg was motivated by her gender or that her age was the reason for the decision. The amended complaint added no relevant facts and continued to rely on conclusory and speculative allegations. The court therefore granted Morgan Stanley’s motion to dismiss the gender and age discrimination claims.

Disability Discrimination

For an Americans with Disabilities Act failure-to-hire claim, the plaintiff must allege, among other things, that the adverse employment action occurred because of her disability. The court said Scalercio-Isenberg still had not alleged that Defendants knew about her disability when they decided not to hire her.

Scalercio-Isenberg also alleged that Morgan Stanley used voluntary answers from its online application portal about disability to screen out applicants and followed an unwritten rule against hiring people with disabilities. The court found that she did not allege that she answered the disability question and provided no facts supporting the alleged improper use of applicants’ answers. The court dismissed the disability discrimination claim.

Title VII Retaliation

A Title VII retaliation claim requires facts showing protected activity, the employer’s awareness of that activity, a materially adverse action, and a connection between the activity and the action. The plaintiff must also have had a good-faith, reasonable belief that she was opposing conduct made unlawful by Title VII.

Scalercio-Isenberg relied on a cease-and-desist letter from Morgan Stanley’s outside counsel and on Morgan Stanley CEO James Gorman’s failure to personally assist her after she contacted him. She characterized those events as evidence of blackballing. The court found that she offered no factual evidence supporting the blackballing theory and that her belief that she was being discriminated against was not reasonable under the circumstances. The court therefore granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the retaliation claims.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

The court noted that self-represented litigants ordinarily should receive a reasonable opportunity to amend, but leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be futile. Because Scalercio-Isenberg had already received one opportunity to amend and the amended complaint did not correct the identified deficiencies, the court denied another opportunity to replead.

The court’s final order granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the motion at Docket Number 44 and close the case.