Rivera v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Service

Background

Edwin Rivera, proceeding without a lawyer, was the director of Homeward Bound Program for Children, Inc., a nonprofit religious organization. He challenged several immigration-related decisions involving the organization and himself. The challenged decisions included the denial of applications seeking recognition of Homeward Bound as an organization authorized to represent people in immigration court and Rivera as an accredited representative. He also challenged the denial of three petitions seeking classification of Homeward Bound members as special immigrant religious workers.

The federal defendants were United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Thomas Cioppa, and Steven Lang, associated with the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Access Programs. The state defendants were the New York State Office of the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General Roberto Lebron. Rivera alleged that the federal immigration decisions improperly relied on earlier New York state-court orders and that the state defendants had pursued false or retaliatory proceedings against him. His claims included emotional distress, negligence and breach of duty, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, due process and equal protection violations, and defamation.

Rulings on the State Defendants

The court dismissed all claims against the New York State Office of the Attorney General and Rivera’s damages claims against Lebron in his official capacity under the Eleventh Amendment, which generally prevents suits against states and their arms in federal court without a waiver or congressional authorization.

The court also ruled that at least three claims against the state defendants were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine prevents a federal district court from acting as an appeal court for a state-court judgment. The court found that Rivera had lost in the state proceeding, complained of injuries caused by state-court orders, sought review and reversal of those orders, and filed this federal case years after those orders were entered.

The court separately held that claim preclusion, also called res judicata, barred at least Rivera’s emotional-distress, malicious-prosecution, and abuse-of-process claims against the state defendants. Claim preclusion prevents a party from relitigating claims that were brought or could have been brought in an earlier case. The court found that the earlier state proceedings and Rivera’s New York Court of Claims action involved the same parties or their legal equivalents and addressed claims or allegations that could have been raised earlier.

The court further held that Lebron had absolute prosecutorial immunity from damages claims based on conduct within his prosecutorial functions. This included allegations concerning the prosecution, arrest warrants, threats of arrest, lack of notice, and statements about Rivera’s conduct. The court also found that certain claims were untimely under applicable one-year or three-year filing deadlines.

Rulings on the Federal Defendants

The court rejected Rivera’s challenge to the denial of the accreditation applications. The decision explained that the applicable regulation allowed consideration of character and fitness, including criminal history and prior acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. The court concluded that the Office of Legal Access Programs could rely on the earlier state-court proceedings and Rivera’s criminal record when evaluating the applications.

The court also rejected Rivera’s challenge to the special immigrant religious worker petitions. It concluded that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services could consider the earlier state-court proceedings when reviewing the organization and that the agency had also identified reasons unrelated to those proceedings, including the petitioners’ alleged lack of qualifying positions or work experience.

The court dismissed Rivera’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the federal defendants because that statute applies to constitutional violations by state actors, not federal officials. The court said that even if the claims were treated as claims for damages under the Constitution, they would not fit within the narrow categories of such claims previously recognized by the Supreme Court, and special factors and other available remedies counseled against creating a new remedy.

The court also held that Rivera failed to state a claim under 5 U.S.C. § 702, part of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court explained that this provision allows a plaintiff to challenge an agency’s failure to take a discrete action the agency was legally required to take, but Rivera had not identified such an action. The court also found that the agency decisions were based on reasons consistent with law.

State-Law Claims Against the Federal Defendants

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Rivera’s state-law claims against the federal defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and breach of duty. The court found no other stated basis for federal jurisdiction over those claims and had dismissed all claims arising under federal law.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. It dismissed the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, except for the three state-law claims against the federal defendants over which it declined to exercise jurisdiction. The court adjourned the remaining dates and closed the case.