Guillebeaux v. H.E.L.P. Homeless Service Corporation

Background

The plaintiff alleges that a former colleague sexually harassed her and that she experienced a sexually abusive and hostile work environment at H.E.L.P. She seeks damages for emotional distress. The parties began her remote video deposition on August 7, 2020. Jody Lirette, H.E.L.P.’s Vice President of Human Resources, attended as H.E.L.P.’s corporate representative.

About six hours into the deposition, when the plaintiff began discussing emotional pain, suffering, and effects on her mental health, she became increasingly uncomfortable and began experiencing symptoms of a panic attack. Her lawyer also was concerned that Lirette was taking notes while she testified about her physical condition and asked him to leave for that portion of the testimony. H.E.L.P.’s lawyer refused, and the parties contacted the Court. The Court ruled during the deposition that H.E.L.P. was entitled to have a representative present and that the deposition should continue.

Motion and arguments

The plaintiff moved for reconsideration of that ruling. She asked the Court to exclude Lirette from the remainder of her deposition under Federal Rule of Evidence 615 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(5). H.E.L.P. opposed the motion, arguing that Lirette was an appropriate corporate representative, that H.E.L.P. should not have to prepare another witness, and that the cited rules did not authorize the requested relief.

Court’s analysis

The Court explained that reconsideration is an exceptional remedy generally available only when the court overlooked controlling law or important information that could reasonably change its decision. A motion for reconsideration is not a chance to repeat arguments already rejected or present arguments that could have been made earlier.

The Court ruled that Federal Rule of Evidence 615, which generally permits witnesses to be excluded so they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony, does not apply to pretrial depositions. The Court also noted that there is no current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(5). The current rule allows a protective order for good cause to protect someone from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.

The Court found that the plaintiff’s testimony about the effects of the alleged hostile work environment and sexual harassment was directly relevant because she seeks emotional-distress damages. The plaintiff had not alleged that Lirette said or did anything inappropriate or unprofessional during the first six hours of the deposition. The Court therefore found no basis for a protective order. It also found that the plaintiff had raised nothing in the reconsideration request that had not already been presented and considered during the deposition.

Disposition

The Court denied the motion for reconsideration and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion at ECF No. 61. The opinion did not dismiss the case or resolve the underlying sexual-harassment claims.