Zappin v. Cooper

Background

Anthony Zappin, a disbarred attorney proceeding without a lawyer, sued Matthew F. Cooper, Kevin M. Doyle, Lauren Liebhauser, Hannah Yu, and Jane Doe. He asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, alleging abuse of process in violation of procedural due process, retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights, and conspiracies to commit those acts.

The allegations concerned a November 2, 2016 incident involving Zappin and Cooper, Zappin’s police report about that incident, the resulting state criminal prosecution, and related attorney-discipline proceedings. Zappin alleged that Cooper and Liebhauser misused the criminal complaint and a temporary order of protection, and that Doyle, Yu, and Doe participated in related misconduct.

Zappin had been allowed to proceed without prepaying filing fees. He later asked the court either to direct the U.S. Marshals Service to serve the defendants or to give him more time to serve them. Although the court had previously directed service, it reviewed the complaint under the screening rules for fee-free cases.

Claims Against Doyle

The court dismissed the claims against Doyle under the doctrine of claim preclusion, also called res judicata. This doctrine generally prevents a party from bringing claims that were already decided, or that could have been brought, in an earlier case involving the same opposing party when that earlier case ended in a merits judgment.

The court found that Doyle, Cooper, and Liebhauser had been defendants in the earlier related proceeding. The claims against Doyle in that proceeding had been dismissed with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which the court held operated as a merits adjudication. The court also found that the earlier proceeding involved the same events and connected transactions, including the November 2nd Incident, the state prosecution, and the attorney-discipline proceedings. Thus, even if Zappin had not asserted identical claims against Doyle earlier, he could have done so, and the claims against Doyle were barred.

Claims Against Yu and Doe

The court dismissed the claims against Yu and Doe because prosecutors have absolute immunity from damages claims under § 1983 for prosecutorial functions closely connected to the judicial phase of a criminal case. The court concluded that Zappin alleged only that Yu and Doe acted in their roles in prosecuting the state case and seeking a temporary order of protection. It therefore held that those activities were protected prosecutorial functions.

Disposition

The court dismissed Zappin’s claims against Doyle, Yu, and Doe with prejudice. It vacated the earlier service orders insofar as they directed service on those three defendants.

The court granted Zappin’s motion to direct the U.S. Marshals Service to serve Cooper and Liebhauser. The court did not decide the merits of the claims against Cooper or Liebhauser. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal.

Classification

This is a procedural order because the court dismissed claims based on claim preclusion and prosecutorial immunity during screening and did not reach the merits of the remaining claims. The order also addressed service of process.