Roker v. Twentieth Century Fox

Background

Damond J. Roker, Sr., who was incarcerated in Tennessee and represented himself, sued Twentieth Century Fox; Fox Broadcasting Company/Fox Television Stations, Inc., doing business as WHBQ-TV, Fox Channel 13; Cox Media Group, Inc.; Kim Guthrie; and Brett Fennell. Roker alleged that he worked as a photo-journalist at WHBQ-TV between 2002 and 2004 and filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge in 2003 alleging that his employer failed to promote him because of his race. He and his employer entered into a private settlement mediated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in January 2004. According to the complaint, the agreement included confidentiality, nondisclosure, and non-disparagement provisions, was governed by New York law, and continued indefinitely.

Roker alleged that WHBQ-TV Fox 13 produced and aired news reports about him between July 1 and July 31, 2016. He described one report as titled “Fox 13 News Uncovers Pastor’s Violent Past” and alleged that the reports were false and misleading, although he did not identify the allegedly false or misleading information. He claimed that the reports were retaliation for his 2004 discrimination charge and that they violated the settlement agreement’s non-disparagement clause. He sought damages, an injunction requiring removal of the news articles, or an order staying the case and compelling arbitration.

Roker asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law. He also asked the court to appoint pro bono counsel. The court had previously allowed him to proceed without paying filing fees.

Screening and federal claims

Because Roker was a prisoner proceeding without paying filing fees, the court reviewed the complaint under federal prisoner-screening statutes. Those statutes require dismissal of claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, seek relief from an immune defendant, or fall outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also applied the rule requiring a complaint to provide enough factual detail to make a claim legally plausible.

The court concluded that Roker could not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because that statute generally applies to conduct under state authority, and all defendants were private individuals or entities rather than state or local officials.

The court also concluded that Roker’s Title VII retaliation allegations were insufficient as pleaded. Although filing the 2004 race-discrimination charge was protected activity, the alleged retaliation occurred in 2016, after Roker had left his employment. The court said Roker had not pleaded facts plausibly connecting the 2016 news reports to the 2004 charge. In particular, it found no plausible basis to infer that the defendants included misleading information in reports about Roker’s arrest because he had filed the earlier discrimination charge.

The court separately found that Roker had not plausibly shown that the settlement agreement’s non-disparagement provision covered the 2016 news reports. The complaint did not make clear what communications the provision prohibited, including whether it barred only false statements or also statements about Roker’s job performance. The court did not decide whether Roker had exhausted any claim concerning breach of the settlement agreement.

State-law claims, jurisdiction, and venue

The court stated that a federal court ordinarily may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when federal claims drop out early. However, Roker alleged that he was a Tennessee citizen and that the corporate defendants were citizens of Georgia, Delaware, and New York. He also appeared to allege that Guthrie and Fennell were domiciled in Georgia. The court therefore stated that Roker might be able to proceed on defamation and other state-law claims under diversity jurisdiction, whether or not he successfully pleaded a federal claim.

The court noted a possible venue problem. Roker alleged that only some defendants resided in the Southern District of New York and that the events underlying his claims occurred outside that district. The court stated that the Western District of Tennessee appeared to be a proper venue because the events took place there. It also noted that Roker appeared to have filed in New York because the settlement agreement contained a New York choice-of-law provision, but a choice-of-law provision alone does not establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction or necessarily establish venue.

Leave to amend

The court granted Roker leave to file a second amended complaint within 60 days. It directed him to include facts plausibly connecting the 2016 reports to his 2004 discrimination charge or facts showing that the settlement agreement’s non-disparagement clause covered the 2016 events. The new complaint would replace, rather than supplement, the amended complaint and therefore had to include every claim and fact Roker wished to maintain.

The court instructed Roker to identify the relevant people and their roles, describe what each defendant did or failed to do, provide dates and locations when known, explain how the conduct violated his rights, describe his injuries, and state the relief requested. The order stated that if Roker failed to amend within the allowed period and could not show good cause, the federal claims in the amended complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the court would consider whether to transfer the state-law claims to the Western District of Tennessee.

Request for counsel and disposition

The court denied Roker’s request for pro bono counsel without prejudice to renewal. It explained that the merits of the case received the most attention in deciding whether to appoint counsel, but it was too early to assess the merits adequately.

Judge Louis L. Stanton denied the request for pro bono counsel without prejudice to renewal and granted leave to file a second amended complaint within 60 days. The order did not dismiss the claims at that stage; it set conditions for further amendment and described possible future dismissal or transfer if Roker did not comply.