Ayyad v. United States

Background

Nidal Ayyad was convicted of multiple felony counts connected to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. His sentence included concurrent prison terms totaling 685 months on Counts 1–6 and 8, plus consecutive 360-month sentences on Counts 9 and 10 under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The aggregate sentence was 1,405 months.

Count 9 was based on an assault-on-a-federal-official charge in Count 8. Count 10 was based on a conspiracy-to-destroy-buildings charge. In a June 24, 2020 order, the court granted Ayyad’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to the extent it vacated his conviction on Count 10 and denied the motion in all other respects. The court stated that it would enter an amended judgment reflecting that ruling.

The Request for Full Resentencing

Ayyad argued that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing for all counts. He relied on Second Circuit decisions stating that, when part of a conviction is overturned, the usual remedy for a conviction error is a new sentencing proceeding. He also argued that his rehabilitation during his incarceration supported a sentence shorter than 1,045 months, which would result from simply removing Count 10’s consecutive 360-month sentence from the original 1,405-month sentence.

The United States argued that this rule applies when a conviction is overturned on direct appeal and the case is sent back for resentencing, not when a court grants relief under § 2255. It also argued that a full resentencing would be inappropriate because of the structure and length of Ayyad’s sentence.

Court’s Analysis

Judge Kaplan explained that the Second Circuit’s general rule for conviction errors applies to cases overturned on appeal and remanded for resentencing. The court found no case applying that rule in the § 2255 context. Section 2255 permits collateral challenges to final criminal judgments only in limited circumstances, reflecting the importance of finality. In the court’s view, requiring a completely new sentencing each time one count of a multi-count conviction is vacated would conflict with that limited procedure.

The court also concluded that a full resentencing was not appropriate in this case even though a district court may have discretion to conduct one after vacating a count through a § 2255 proceeding. The vacated 360-month sentence on Count 10 was one of two consecutive 30-year sentences designed to keep Ayyad imprisoned after the concurrent sentences on the other counts. According to the court, removing Count 10 did not undo the overall sentencing calculation or show that the sentences on the other counts were inseparably connected to Count 10.

The court further noted that Ayyad had previously appealed from his sentences, and that arguments he raised had been rejected while arguments he did not raise might have been waived. The court also reasoned that a full resentencing was unlikely to have a practical effect because Count 9 still required a consecutive 360-month sentence. To provide Ayyad a meaningful chance of release before his death, the sentences on Counts 1–6 and 8 would have needed to be reduced substantially; the court considered such a sentence unlikely given the offenses’ circumstances.

Disposition

The court declined to conduct a full resentencing. It will enter an amended judgment reflecting the vacatur of Count 10 and reducing Ayyad’s aggregate term of imprisonment by 360 months. The opinion does not state that the amended judgment had already been entered as of the opinion date.