Jones v. Banks

Background

Keisha A. Jones, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She stated that she resided in a Manhattan shelter and complained about events involving shelters operated or connected to the New York City Department of Social Services and its contractors. Her allegations included assignment to an undesirable congregate shelter, concerns about COVID-19 and unnamed preexisting medical conditions, nighttime room entries, inadequate food and water, an alleged scheme involving her Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits and cash, harassment, retaliation, and denial of reasonable accommodations.

Jones sought money damages, policy changes, and injunctive relief. Her requested orders included stopping nighttime room entries, ending alleged harassment and targeting, providing records, obtaining documents from Help USA, auditing and monitoring Help USA shelters, allowing certain appliances in the shelter, and addressing requests for emergency assistance to pay for storage.

Claims and Screening Analysis

The court reviewed the complaint under the screening requirements for people allowed to proceed without prepaying filing fees. It explained that such a complaint must be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, seeks money from an immune defendant, or presents no federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also explained that pleadings filed without a lawyer are read liberally but still must provide enough factual detail to make a claim plausible.

For the § 1983 claims, the court said Jones needed to allege both a violation of a federal right and conduct by a person acting under state law. She also needed to allege each defendant’s direct and personal involvement. The court found that Jones had not alleged facts showing how HRA Commissioner Steven Banks or the DSS employees personally participated in violating her constitutional rights. It further stated that there is no constitutional right to a well-run shelter system, adequate housing, or placement in a particular type of shelter.

The court noted that Jones did not name the City of New York but might have intended to seek policy changes from the City. It explained that a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only when its own policy, custom, or practice caused the alleged violation, and found that Jones had not identified such a policy, custom, or practice or explained how it injured her.

The court also considered a possible claim under the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits certain housing discrimination and retaliation and can address discrimination based on disability. The court found that Jones had not identified the nature of her disability or specified the reasonable accommodations she requested. It allowed her to provide more facts supporting that claim in an amended complaint.

As to “Nonprofit Corporation 1-5,” the court said Jones had not alleged facts showing that those private entities acted under state law. The court explained that private conduct may be treated as state action under certain tests, including state coercion or control, joint activity with the state, or performance of a function delegated by the state. It found that the complaint did not suggest that the nonprofits’ actions were attributable to the government, while allowing Jones to add supporting facts if they existed.

Temporary Restraining Order

Jones filed an order to show cause seeking a temporary restraining order. The court stated that this extraordinary relief required a showing of likely irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions combined with a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff.

Because the alleged facts did not state a viable claim under § 1983 or the Fair Housing Act, the court found that Jones had not shown a likelihood of success or sufficiently serious questions for litigation. The court therefore denied the request for an order to show cause. In the conclusion, it specified that the order to show cause was denied without prejudice.

Leave to Amend and Other Claims

The court granted Jones 60 days to file an amended complaint. It directed her to identify the individuals allegedly involved, describe what each defendant did or failed to do, provide relevant dates and locations, explain how the conduct violated federal rights, describe her injuries, state the relief sought, and provide addresses for named defendants. The amended complaint would replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint. The court stated that if Jones failed to amend within the allowed time and could not show good cause, the complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

The court did not decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims. It said that issue would be considered later because it was not yet clear whether Jones could state a federal claim.

Disposition

Judge Louis L. Stanton granted Jones leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days and denied the order to show cause without prejudice. The order did not finally dismiss the complaint at that stage.