Melendez v. Carranza

Background

The order addresses four related cases brought by Brenda L. Melendez, individually and as parent and natural guardian of J.C.; Carolyn Mason, individually and as parent and natural guardian of A.D.; and Nahoko Mizuta and Kentaro Mizuta, individually and as parents and natural guardians of Y.M. The defendants were the New York City Department of Education, its Chancellor Richard Carranza, and, in one case, the New York State Education Department.

The parents sought injunctive relief under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, a federal special-education law, and related state law. They asked the court to order the defendants to fund tuition at iBrain, the school the children were attending and that the parents had unilaterally selected as the children’s temporary educational placement while their ongoing administrative complaints were resolved.

Earlier Ruling

On July 24, 2020, the court denied the parents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought immediate relief, and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court relied on a recent Second Circuit decision involving materially similar circumstances. That decision held that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act did not require New York City to fund students’ program at iBrain during the dispute over their educational plans, even if iBrain’s program was substantially similar to the students’ earlier program at iHope. The Second Circuit reasoned that the parents had enrolled the students at iBrain at their own financial risk.

Reconsideration Standard

The parents moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3. Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy. Under the standards described by the court, it may be granted only when the moving party identifies an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, a clear error, or a need to prevent serious injustice. It is not a vehicle for repeating old arguments, presenting new theories, seeking another hearing on the merits, or using disagreement with the court’s ruling as a substitute for an appeal.

Arguments and Analysis

The parents argued that the court had overlooked a distinction between their cases and the earlier Second Circuit decision. They contended that, unlike in that decision, the child J.C.’s iHope placement became the temporary placement required during the dispute by operation of law rather than through the Department of Education’s choice or an agreement with the parents.

The court stated that it had already considered and rejected that argument. It further stated that J.C. had an established temporary placement, so the asserted distinction did not change the result. The court also noted that the briefing referred only to J.C.; it said that arguments concerning the other plaintiffs and the Mizutas appeared to have been waived.

Disposition

Judge Edgardo Ramos denied the reconsideration application. The court concluded that the parents had not shown a change in controlling law, new evidence, clear error, or a need to prevent serious injustice. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the four reconsideration motions identified in the order.