Melendez v. New York City Department of Education
- Edgardo Ramos
- 1:19-cv-02928
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 6
In Melendez v. New York City Department of Education, Judge Ramos denied reconsideration of dismissal of parents’ IDEA funding claims for iBrain tuition.
The order affected Brenda L. Melendez and the other named parents and guardians, the children identified as J.C., A.D., and Y.M., and the New York City Department of Education, Richard Carranza, and, in one related case, the New York State Education Department.
What happened
In Melendez v. New York City Department of Education, parents of children with serious brain injuries sought an order requiring education officials to fund tuition at iBrain while their special-education disputes continued. The court had previously denied their request for emergency relief and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, relying on a Second Circuit decision involving similar facts.
The parents argued that their cases differed because the children’s prior school, iHope, became the required temporary placement by operation of law rather than by agreement with the education department. The court said it had already considered and rejected that argument and that the distinction did not change the result.
Judge Edgardo Ramos denied the motions for reconsideration in all four related cases, concluding that the parents had not shown a change in controlling law, new evidence, clear error, or manifest injustice.
The detailed version
- Melendez v. New York City Department of Education · No. 1:19-cv-02928
- Edgardo Ramos
- Aug. 31, 2020
Background
The order addresses four related cases brought by Brenda L. Melendez, individually and as parent and natural guardian of J.C.; and, in one of the cases, Carolyn Mason, individually and as parent and natural guardian of A.D., and Nahoko Mizuta and Kentaro Mizuta, individually and as parents and natural guardians of Y.M. The defendants were the New York City Department of Education, its Chancellor Richard Carranza, and, in one case, the New York State Education Department.
The parents sought injunctive relief under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and related state law. They asked the court to require the defendants to fund tuition at iBrain, which the children were attending and which the parents had unilaterally selected as the children’s temporary placement while their administrative education disputes were pending.
On July 24, 2020, the court denied the parents’ motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court relied on a recent Second Circuit decision involving similar facts, which held that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act did not require New York City to fund students’ program at iBrain during the pendency of their disputes when the parents had enrolled them there at their own financial risk.
Motions for Reconsideration
The parents moved for reconsideration in each related case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3. Reconsideration is an exceptional remedy. Under the standards described by the court, it may be granted based on an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, a clear error, manifest injustice, or controlling legal or factual matters that the court overlooked and that might have changed the result. It is not a vehicle for repeating arguments already considered or seeking a second review of the original ruling.
The parents argued that the court had overlooked a meaningful difference between their cases and the Second Circuit decision: in that earlier case, the parents and the City had agreed that iHope would be the educational and temporary placement, while here, they argued, iHope became J.C.’s temporary placement by operation of law rather than by the education department’s choice.
Court’s Analysis and Ruling
The court stated that it had already considered and rejected this argument in its July 24 order. It also stated that J.C.’s established temporary placement remained undisputed, making the asserted difference legally insignificant. The court concluded that the parents had not shown a change in controlling law, new evidence, clear error, or manifest injustice. A footnote stated that the briefing referred only to J.C. and that arguments concerning the other plaintiffs and the Mizutas appeared to have been waived.
Judge Edgardo Ramos denied the application for reconsideration and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the four listed motions. The order’s action was a denial of reconsideration; it did not alter the court’s earlier denial of preliminary relief and grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.