Ramos v. United States

Background

Cruz Manuel Ramos was convicted in two trials of conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery, using and brandishing a firearm during the attempted robbery, drug conspiracy, and two drug-distribution offenses. The court sentenced him principally to 348 months in prison and 12 years of supervised release. The sentence included a mandatory consecutive 60-month term for the firearm conviction in Count Three.

Before trial, the Government filed a prior felony information based on Ramos’s 1996 New Jersey conviction for distributing a controlled substance. That filing increased the mandatory minimum sentence for Count Twelve and increased the maximum prison terms and mandatory supervised-release terms for Counts Fourteen and Fifteen. The New Jersey conviction was later vacated by a New Jersey court.

Ramos filed an amended motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allows a federal prisoner to challenge a sentence in specified circumstances. He argued that Count Three should be vacated because attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson and Davis. He also sought resentencing on all remaining counts because the vacated New Jersey conviction had affected his federal sentence. The Government agreed that resentencing was required on the drug counts but opposed resentencing on Counts One and Two.

Count Three and the firearm conviction

Section 924(c) imposes additional punishment when a firearm is used, carried, or possessed during a qualifying crime of violence. After Davis, an offense qualifies under the statute’s force clause only if its elements necessarily include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Courts apply a categorical approach, examining the minimum conduct required for conviction rather than the facts of the particular case.

The court noted that the Second Circuit had held that completed Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of violence, while Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy is not. It had not decided whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies. The court considered decisions reaching both conclusions and found persuasive the reasoning that an attempt conviction requires intent to commit the completed offense and a substantial step toward committing it, but does not necessarily require conduct involving physical force.

The court relied in part on Second Circuit authority stating that surveilling a target can constitute the substantial step required for attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Because that minimum conduct does not necessarily involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, the court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the force clause. It therefore granted the Johnson portion of Ramos’s motion and vacated the Count Three conviction.

Resentencing

The court held that Ramos was entitled to resentencing on Counts Twelve, Fourteen, and Fifteen. The prior felony information had increased the mandatory minimum for Count Twelve from 10 years to 20 years and increased the maximum terms for Counts Fourteen and Fifteen from 20 years to 30 years. Because the prior conviction had been vacated, the court concluded that it had to consider the proper sentencing ranges when reimposing sentences on those counts.

The court denied resentencing on Counts One and Two. It had imposed 240-month sentences on both counts, which were the statutory maximums. Although vacating the New Jersey conviction would reduce Ramos’s criminal-history category and advisory Guidelines range, the statutory maximum capped the Guidelines sentence for those counts at 240 months. The court found that those sentences remained lawful and that the changes to the other counts did not show a fundamental injustice requiring relief under § 2255.

Disposition

The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. It vacated the judgment of conviction on Count Three and vacated the sentences on Counts Twelve, Fourteen, and Fifteen. It denied the request for resentencing on Counts One and Two. The court directed the Probation Office to prepare an updated presentence report and set a resentencing hearing for November 2, 2020. The order also directed entry of judgment and closure of the related civil case, No. 16 CV 4499-LTS.