Carter v. New York Stock Exchange,
- Louis Stanton
- 1:20-cv-04823
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 6
In Carter v. New York Stock Exchange, Judge Stanton dismissed the complaint because Carter did not show a personal injury giving the court jurisdiction.
Terence Mack Carter’s complaint was dismissed, and he was not allowed to amend it; the New York Stock Exchange was the defendant.
What happened
In Carter v. New York Stock Exchange, Terence Mack Carter, who was incarcerated and represented himself, alleged that the New York Stock Exchange facilitated the historical buying and selling of enslaved Africans, including his ancestors. He sought money damages for the resulting harm to his family.
The court ruled that Carter did not allege a concrete, personal injury that could support his standing to sue, and therefore dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also stated that the claims were filed far beyond the applicable three-year limitations period and that the New York Stock Exchange was a private party that could not be sued under the civil-rights statute at issue. The court denied permission to amend because it found the defects could not be fixed.
Judge Louis L. Stanton issued the September 2, 2020 order directing dismissal of Carter’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The detailed version
- Carter v. New York Stock Exchange, · No. 1:20-cv-04823
- Louis Stanton
- Sept. 2, 2020
Background
Terence Mack Carter filed a one-page complaint against the New York Stock Exchange while incarcerated and representing himself. The court had previously allowed him to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. Carter alleged that the New York Stock Exchange facilitated the buying, selling, and trade of enslaved Africans on Wall Street, including his ancestors. He alleged that the resulting separation and suffering continued to affect his family and requested money damages.
Standing and jurisdiction
The court held that Carter did not allege facts establishing Article III standing, which is the requirement that a plaintiff show a concrete injury to himself that was caused by the defendant and could be remedied by a court decision. The court said Carter’s allegations about suffering over hundreds of years did not identify a discrete, personal injury to him. It also said he did not identify a constitutional or statutory right that the New York Stock Exchange violated, or another basis for federal-question jurisdiction.
Because the court found that Carter lacked standing, it concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction—the power to hear the case—and dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).
Additional grounds discussed
The court stated that, even if Carter had standing, his claims would be untimely. It explained that the applicable limitations period for civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years in New York, while the events described in the complaint occurred more than 150 years earlier.
The court also stated that Carter failed to state a claim under § 1983 because that statute generally requires action taken under state law, and the New York Stock Exchange is a private party that does not work for a state or other government body.
Disposition
The court denied leave to amend because it found that the defects in the complaint could not be cured by amendment. Judge Louis L. Stanton ordered that Carter’s complaint, filed under the procedure allowing a person to proceed without prepaying fees, was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.