Chevron Corporation v. Donziger
- Lewis Kaplan
- 1:11-cv-00691
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 11
In United States v. Donziger, Judge Preska denied Donziger’s jury-trial motion, ruling that his contempt charges were petty and would be tried by the court.
Steven Donziger, who was denied a jury trial on the criminal contempt charges; the United States would proceed with a trial before the court.
What happened
United States v. Donziger concerned Steven Donziger’s renewed request for a jury trial on criminal contempt charges. The court had previously decided that any sentence would not exceed six months in prison or a $5,000 fine.
Donziger argued that federal laws gave him a jury-trial right because the charged conduct allegedly amounted to obstruction of justice. He also argued that the Constitution required a jury because the charges were serious rather than petty.
Judge Loretta A. Preska rejected both arguments and denied the motion. She ruled that the alleged conduct did not include the corrupt intent required for obstruction of justice and that the punishment cap made the contempt charges petty offenses, so the trial would be before the court.
The detailed version
- Chevron Corporation v. Donziger · No. 1:11-cv-00691
- Lewis Kaplan
- Sept. 4, 2020
Background
The court considered Steven Donziger’s renewed motion for a jury trial. In an earlier order, the court had denied his request subject to renewal after deciding the possible punishment. The court later ruled that, if Donziger were convicted, the sentence would not exceed six months’ imprisonment or a $5,000 fine. It therefore determined that the trial would be before the judge. Donziger did not move to reconsider that ruling, and his other filings generally treated the issue as settled.
Statutory jury-trial claim
Donziger argued that 18 U.S.C. §§ 402 and 3691 gave contempt defendants a right to a jury trial when the conduct charged also constitutes an independent federal or state crime. He claimed that the conduct alleged in Counts I and II constituted obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
The court rejected that argument. It explained that obstruction of justice under § 1503 requires corrupt intent to impede the administration of a judicial proceeding. Counts I and II alleged that Donziger knowingly and willfully failed to comply with court orders, but they did not allege the required corrupt intent. The court therefore held that the alleged contempt did not constitute criminal obstruction of justice and that §§ 402 and 3691 did not provide a jury-trial right.
Constitutional jury-trial claim
Donziger also relied on the Sixth Amendment, which generally provides a jury-trial right in criminal prosecutions. The court explained that the Constitution does not automatically require a jury for a “petty” offense, including criminal contempt carrying a possible sentence of less than six months.
Because the court had capped Donziger’s possible punishment at six months’ imprisonment or a $5,000 fine, it treated the charges as petty offenses. The court declined to treat other factors—such as the possible effect of a conviction on Donziger’s ability to practice law, the alleged moral seriousness of the charges, or his pretrial release conditions—as making the charges serious enough to require a jury.
Disposition
Judge Preska denied Donziger’s renewed motion for a trial by jury. The order states that his trial will be conducted by the court.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.