Campbell v. City of Yonkers

Background

Robert Campbell, individually and as administrator of Erick Campbell’s estate, and Aida Campbell and Eric Campbell brought two consolidated actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Bivens, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants included the United States, four Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, the City of Yonkers, Yonkers police officers and supervisors, and officers from Westchester County and Tarrytown. The claims arose from Erick Campbell’s death on December 15, 2017, during a task-force surveillance operation concerning a vehicle allegedly reported stolen and used in a bank robbery.

According to the complaints, the officers approached Campbell in unmarked vehicles without identifying themselves as law enforcement or activating lights or sirens. The complaints alleged that officers rammed the vehicle, fired 27 rounds, struck Campbell multiple times, searched the vehicle and Campbell after the shooting, and only later began cardiopulmonary resuscitation and requested an ambulance. Campbell was declared dead at 4:50 p.m. The court considered these allegations as true for purposes of the motions to dismiss.

Motions and jurisdiction

The United States, the FBI defendants, and Detective Terence Malone moved to dismiss. The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged, at the pleading stage, that Sergeant Mark Wissner and Officers Timothy Cooper and Thomas Braig could have been acting as agents of or on behalf of the FBI during the operation. The court therefore declined to dismiss the Federal Tort Claims Act claims against the United States to the extent they arose from those officers’ alleged conduct, while noting that later evidence might show their conduct could not legally be attributed to the United States.

The court also rejected the argument that the complaints improperly grouped defendants together under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. It concluded that the allegations gave the moving defendants fair notice of the claims against them.

Claims dismissed

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims against the FBI defendants because the complaints did not plausibly explain how the defendants violated Campbell’s First Amendment rights, and because the Supreme Court had not recognized a damages remedy under Bivens for First Amendment claims.

The court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claims against the FBI defendants and Detective Malone because Campbell was not convicted or incarcerated when the incident occurred. The court stated that the alleged force during the attempted arrest implicated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments instead.

The court dismissed claims alleging that the attempted arrest itself violated the Fourth Amendment because, based on the complaints, the officers had probable cause to attempt the arrest after observing Campbell approach and enter the vehicle. The court distinguished that issue from whether the force used during the attempted arrest was lawful.

The court dismissed the conspiracy claims against the FBI defendants and Detective Malone because the allegations of an agreement to violate Campbell’s rights were conclusory. It also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument based on 42 U.S.C. § 1985 because the complaints did not allege a racial or other class-based discriminatory motive.

The court dismissed the state-law assault-and-battery claim against the FBI defendants because Bivens did not provide a remedy for that state-law claim and federal employees have immunity from tort claims arising from acts performed within their official duties. It allowed the Federal Tort Claims Act assault-and-battery claim against the United States to proceed and allowed the assault-and-battery claim against Detective Malone to proceed.

The court dismissed the negligence and negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims against the United States and Detective Malone. It also dismissed the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against the United States because the plaintiffs did not allege that they witnessed the incident or that their own physical safety was endangered. The court dismissed both the negligent- and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against Detective Malone for similar reasons, including that the intentional-infliction claim duplicated the excessive-force and assault-and-battery claims.

Claims allowed to proceed

The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged an excessive-force claim against FBI Special Agent Brendan Kenney under Bivens. Although Kenney argued that Campbell’s attempt to drive away, reports that Campbell had a gun, and the gunfire supported his use of deadly force, the complaints alleged that the officers did not identify themselves and that Campbell did not know he was being arrested. The court concluded that whether deadly force was objectively reasonable could not be decided on a motion to dismiss.

The court also allowed Bivens claims against FBI Agents Andrew Fisher, Daniel Conlon, and Daniel McKenna based on an alleged failure to intervene. The court treated failure to intervene as a theory of liability for the alleged excessive force, rather than as a separate constitutional violation. It concluded that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that these agents were present during the shooting and had failed to take action to prevent or limit it. The court allowed Detective Malone’s similar failure-to-intervene claim under § 1983 to proceed.

The court allowed deliberate-indifference claims against the FBI defendants and Detective Malone to proceed. Deliberate indifference means disregarding a serious medical need. The court found the allegations sufficient at this stage to suggest that the defendants knew Campbell had been seriously wounded but did not seek medical treatment within a reasonable time. The court noted that the complaints did not provide a precise timeline and that later evidence could show the defendants responded promptly.

The court also allowed the plaintiffs’ derivative wrongful-death, conscious-pain-and-suffering, and loss-of-love, support, and family claims to proceed because the underlying assault-and-battery claims against the United States and Detective Malone survived dismissal.

Qualified immunity and disposition

The court declined to dismiss the excessive-force, assault-and-battery, and deliberate-indifference claims on qualified-immunity grounds. Qualified immunity can protect government officials unless their conduct violated a clearly established right and was objectively unreasonable. The court concluded that the relevant legal standards were clearly established, while the allegations raised factual questions about whether the officers identified themselves, whether the use of deadly force was reasonable, whether the officers had a realistic opportunity to intervene, and whether medical care was delayed.

The court’s final order stated that the motions to dismiss were granted in part and denied in part. It dismissed the specific claims identified in the conclusion and stated that all other claims would proceed. The United States and the moving FBI agents and Detective Malone were directed to file answers by September 29, 2020. Judge Vincent L. Briccetti instructed the Clerk to terminate the motions.