Morgan v. Doe 1

Background

Adrian Lashawn Morgan, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three unidentified correctional officers and Rikers Island. The court later dismissed the claims against Rikers Island, added the City of New York as a defendant, and directed the City to identify the unidentified officers. Morgan was then allowed to file an amended complaint naming the City, additional unidentified correctional officers and employees, Correctional Officer Schroeder, and Captain Ashlei Peterson.

The City identified Peterson but said it needed more detailed descriptions to identify the remaining defendants. The court directed Morgan to respond to the City or file a second amended complaint. After Morgan requested more time, the court extended the deadline. Morgan later asked the court to direct the City to use other sources to identify the remaining defendants instead of providing more detail.

Motion and Rule 41(b) standard

The City warned Morgan that failing to file a second amended complaint could lead to a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The City then moved to dismiss the first amended complaint under Rule 41(b), which allows a court to dismiss a case when a plaintiff does not actively pursue it. The court directed Morgan to respond and warned that failing to do so could result in dismissal. Morgan did not communicate with the court or respond to the motion.

The court considered five factors: the length of Morgan’s delay, whether he received notice that further delay could result in dismissal, likely prejudice to the defendants, whether the court balanced case-management concerns with Morgan’s right to be heard, and whether lesser sanctions could work.

Court’s analysis

The court found that all five factors favored dismissal. Morgan had not responded to the City’s motion, which had been pending for more than six months, and had not followed the court’s order requiring a response. The court found that Morgan had received clear notice that the case could be dismissed.

The court also held that prejudice to the defendants could be presumed from the delay. It concluded that Morgan had not used his opportunity to be heard and that the court was not required to pursue a plaintiff who had stopped participating. Because the delay had not greatly affected the court’s calendar, the court determined that dismissal without prejudice—not a decision on the merits—was appropriate. The court also found that, given Morgan’s self-represented status, no lesser sanction would adequately address his failure to prosecute.

Ruling and disposition

Judge Edgardo Ramos dismissed Morgan’s case without prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b). The order did not decide whether Morgan’s civil-rights claims were legally valid. The clerk was directed to terminate all outstanding motions and close the case.