Milord-Francois v. The New York State Office of the Medicaid Inspector General

Background

Ferlande Milord-Francois, a Black attorney of Haitian descent, worked for the New York State Office of the Medicaid Inspector General (OMIG). She was promoted on a probationary basis from Senior Attorney to Associate Attorney, a supervisory position. After receiving two unsatisfactory probation reports, she was returned to her Senior Attorney position.

Milord-Francois alleged that Robyn Henzel, a subordinate attorney, made racially offensive comments, including referring to her as having an “angry black face.” She also alleged that OMIG officials failed to address Henzel’s conduct and that OMIG retaliated against her after she complained by giving her negative evaluations and demoting her. Her claims arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Equal Protection Clause, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence requires a trial or instead entitles a party to judgment as a matter of law.

Discrimination and retaliation claims

The court held that Milord-Francois did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that General Counsel Janine Daniels-Rivera or Medicaid Inspector General Dennis Rosen acted with discriminatory intent. Daniels-Rivera had promoted Milord-Francois earlier and based the later demotion on her assessment of Milord-Francois’s supervision, work product, judgment, and management of subordinate attorneys. The court found no evidence that Henzel manipulated Daniels-Rivera into making the decision.

The court also found that Rosen did not meaningfully participate in the demotion decision. His alleged comments about Milord-Francois’s demeanor, including referring to her as having a “scowl face,” were not shown to be racially motivated or connected to the decision-making process. The court treated those comments as stray remarks that did not support an inference of discrimination.

For retaliation, the court accepted that Milord-Francois’s reports to a labor-relations official and to Daniels-Rivera could qualify as protected activity and that the negative evaluations and demotion were adverse employment actions. But the court held that she did not provide sufficient evidence that her complaints were the necessary cause of those actions or that OMIG’s stated performance reasons were a pretext for retaliation. The court noted that Daniels-Rivera had expressed concerns about Milord-Francois’s supervisory performance before the alleged complaints and continued to document concerns afterward.

Hostile work environment

The court held that the evidence did not create a triable hostile-work-environment claim under Title VII, Section 1983, or the New York State Human Rights Law. It considered the specific incidents involving Henzel, including the “angry black face” comment, comments about Harlem, alleged remarks about drugs, and other hostile interactions. Even viewing the evidence in Milord-Francois’s favor, the court found the incidents insufficiently severe, continuous, or concerted to alter the conditions of employment.

The court also found that Milord-Francois’s generalized testimony that Henzel repeatedly called her “angry face” or “scary face” lacked enough detail to show how often the comments occurred or that they were racial in nature. The court noted evidence that Henzel had difficult interactions with employees of different races.

New York City claims and disposition

The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the New York State Human Rights Law claims because those claims used the same standards as the federal claims. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the New York City Human Rights Law claims because that law uses a broader standard and the court had not addressed those claims under that standard. The court dismissed the New York City claims without prejudice.

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the claims under Title VII, Section 1983, and the New York State Human Rights Law. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the New York City Human Rights Law claims, which it dismissed without prejudice.