Mateo v. Westchester County

Background

Franklin Mateo, a self-represented plaintiff and formerly a pretrial detainee at Westchester County Jail, sued Westchester County; the Westchester County Department of Corrections; Commissioner Kevin Cheverko; Aramark Correctional Services, LLC; and Aramark employees Manual Mendoza, Charles Butler, Coffey Kohli, Penny Stewart, and Craig Boissy. He sought monetary and punitive damages based on food service at the jail.

Mateo alleged that he received rotten, stale, undercooked, contaminated, or otherwise unsanitary food, including food containing hair and insects, and that meals were served on dirty trays. He alleged nausea, vomiting, and significant weight loss. He also alleged that the defendants knew about food-service problems through inmate grievances and earlier lawsuits. The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim.

Claims and analysis

The court considered deposition transcripts attached to the complaint because attached documents can be treated as part of the complaint. It also allowed the complaint to rely on the existence of earlier proceedings to show that defendants may have had notice of food-service complaints, but not to establish that the factual assertions in those earlier proceedings were true.

The court dismissed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act claims. It explained that the statute had been invalidated as applied to states and their subdivisions. The claims were dismissed without prejudice as to the individually named defendants and with prejudice as to the state entity.

The court dismissed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claims with prejudice. It explained that Mateo’s transfer from the Westchester County Jail mooted the available injunctive relief and that the statute did not authorize the damages relief at issue against state officers.

The court dismissed the First Amendment Free Exercise claim without prejudice because Mateo did not allege facts showing that his own religious beliefs or practices were involved. The court likewise dismissed without prejudice the Equal Protection claim and the separate religious-discrimination claim because the complaint did not specifically allege Mateo’s religious affiliation or discrimination against him.

The court held that Mateo’s allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage to support a municipal-liability claim under Monell, the rule allowing a municipality to be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a policy or custom that caused a constitutional violation. The alleged volume of inmate grievances, the alleged notice of earlier food-related lawsuits, and allegations about kitchen supervision could support an inference of a widespread practice or custom.

The court also held that Mateo sufficiently alleged Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims based on the food service. It considered his allegations of injury, possible exposure to rat feces, and the history of food-related grievances sufficient at this stage to allege both a sufficiently serious condition and deliberate indifference, meaning disregard of a known substantial risk to inmate health or safety. The court denied the motion to dismiss those claims against Westchester County, its agent, and Butler, Kohli, Stewart, and Boissy.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment failure-to-intervene claims without prejudice only as to Cheverko and Mendoza because Mateo did not adequately allege their personal involvement beyond describing their positions and responsibilities. The court did not grant Cheverko qualified immunity on the motion because the defendants had not met their burden to establish that defense from the face of the complaint.

Disposition

The court stated that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The RLUIPA claims were dismissed with prejudice. The RFRA claims were dismissed with prejudice as to the state entity and without prejudice as to the individually named defendants. The First Amendment Free Exercise claims were dismissed without prejudice. The Eighth Amendment failure-to-intervene claims were dismissed without prejudice only as to Cheverko and Mendoza. The motion was denied as to the Eighth Amendment cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims against the municipality, its agent, and the four personally involved employees.

Mateo was given until November 14, 2020, to file an amended complaint. The order stated that failure to do so could result in dismissal with prejudice of claims dismissed without prejudice. The clerk was directed to terminate Cheverko and Mendoza as defendants and to terminate the motion at issue.