Bromfield-Thompson v. American University of Antigua/Manipal Education Americas

Background

Debbie Ann Bromfield-Thompson, proceeding without a lawyer, sued American University of Antigua (AUA), Manipal Education Americas, LLC (MEA), and the National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME). She alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the New York Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. She also included intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, but stated that she was no longer pursuing those claims.

Bromfield-Thompson alleged that she was dyslexic and had received extra time as an examination accommodation while attending AUA’s medical school. She took the Comprehensive Clinical Science Exam five times. After she did not obtain a required passing score, AUA dismissed her in July 2016. She alleged that she had requested a two-day testing format because taking the examination in one lengthy sitting caused her severe pain. AUA instead arranged additional time and breaks, and extended her graduation deadline, but she still did not pass. She appealed the dismissal and alleged that AUA did not respond.

AUA’s motion

AUA moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process, Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court granted AUA’s motion under Rule 12(b)(5).

The court concluded that Bromfield-Thompson had not shown that she served AUA through an authorized person. The documents were delivered to Anita O’Brien, an administrative assistant at MEA, rather than an AUA employee or person authorized to accept service for AUA. The court also noted AUA’s sworn statement that it had no office in New York or elsewhere in the United States, and concluded that the location where service occurred appeared to be MEA’s office. The court dismissed the claims against AUA without prejudice. It noted that the dismissal was technically without prejudice under Rule 4(m), although a limitations period might prevent new claims.

NBME’s motion

NBME moved under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing, Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court dismissed Bromfield-Thompson’s claims against NBME without prejudice to refiling in a district with personal jurisdiction over NBME under Rule 12(b)(2).

The court found no general personal jurisdiction because NBME was incorporated in Washington, D.C., and had its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, not New York. It also found insufficient specific personal jurisdiction. The claims concerned examinations taken in Virginia by a Washington, D.C. resident enrolled at an Antiguan medical school. The alleged New York connection was that NBME communicated with AUA’s New York office about testing accommodations. The court concluded that those communications were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute or federal due-process requirements. The court also rejected reliance on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(B), explaining that provision applies only to a party joined under Rule 14 or Rule 19, not to NBME, which was originally named in the complaint.

MEA’s motion

MEA moved under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court granted MEA’s motion and dismissed the claims against MEA. It concluded that the complaint did not allege that MEA engaged in wrongdoing. The allegations concerning MEA were primarily about jurisdiction or MEA’s relationship with AUA, including that MEA was AUA’s agent and provided services to AUA. The court found those allegations insufficient to support a reasonable inference that MEA was liable for the alleged misconduct. The dismissal of the claims against MEA was not accompanied by a with-prejudice or without-prejudice designation in the conclusion.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed Bromfield-Thompson’s complaint in its entirety. It did not reach the defendants’ other dismissal arguments. The court declined to grant another opportunity to amend because Bromfield-Thompson had already amended her complaint, did not request another amendment, did not identify additional facts that could cure the defects, and had previously been warned that she would not receive another opportunity to amend. The clerk was directed to close the case.