Twardosz v. Yonkers Public School District
- Kenneth Karas
- 7:19-cv-06138
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 13
In Twardosz v. Yonkers Public School District, Judge Karas granted dismissal of Tara Twardosz’s due-process claims without prejudice.
Tara Twardosz’s Fourteenth Amendment due-process and reputation-based claims against Yonkers Public School District and First Mile Square, LLC were dismissed without prejudice, with 30 days allowed to amend.
What happened
Tara Twardosz, a bus driver employed by First Mile Square, LLC, alleged that Yonkers Public School District and First Mile improperly removed her from a bus route she had selected under a union agreement. She claimed this violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to fair procedures and harmed her reputation and career.
The court ruled that the selected bus route was not a constitutionally protected property interest because Twardosz did not allege that she lost her job, wages, benefits, or a permanent opportunity. The court also dismissed her reputation-based claim because she did not allege that the statements about her were made public; the email appeared to be internal.
Judge Karas granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and dismissed the claims without prejudice. The court allowed Twardosz 30 days to file an amended complaint.
The detailed version
- Twardosz v. Yonkers Public School District · No. 7:19-cv-06138
- Kenneth Karas
- Oct. 16, 2020
Background
Tara Twardosz sued Yonkers Public School District and First Mile Square, LLC, alleging that the defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in connection with her employment. Twardosz was employed by First Mile as a bus driver, and First Mile was contracted by Yonkers Public School District to transport students. Twardosz was a member of a union covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
The agreement stated that drivers would select routes by seniority before the school year. Twardosz selected a route in August 2016 and began driving it in September. In January 2017, Shelley O’Riley, the Yonkers Public School District’s Director of Transportation, emailed First Mile and a Yonkers Public School District recipient stating that Twardosz could no longer service her requested route. The email accused Twardosz of harassing parents, students, and a bus monitor, and described her conduct as rigid, arrogant, and mean-spirited. Twardosz alleged that she was removed from the route without being told about the accusations, receiving a description of the charges, or being offered a hearing.
The collective bargaining agreement included provisions concerning discipline and grievance hearings. A union representative later asked Yonkers Public School District for notice of the charges and a hearing. Twardosz alleged that the district did not respond. The union also asked First Mile for a second-level hearing, but First Mile responded that it could not restore Twardosz to the selected route. Twardosz alleged reputational harm, humiliation, emotional distress, and difficulty obtaining raises or promotions. She sought restoration to her former route, damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees.
Defendants’ Motion
The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legally sufficient claim. They argued that Twardosz had no property interest in the selected route, that the collective bargaining agreement did not create such an interest, and that Yonkers Public School District was not a party to the agreement. Regarding Twardosz’s reputation-based claim, they argued that the statements were not sufficiently stigmatizing, were not public, and were not connected to a sufficient loss of employment or legal status.
Court’s Analysis
The court first considered Twardosz’s claim that removing her from the selected bus route deprived her of a property interest without due process. The court explained that some contractual rights, including certain rights under collective bargaining agreements, may receive constitutional protection. But not every breach of a contract creates a constitutional property deprivation. The relevant question was whether the interest had the importance and permanence associated with constitutional protection.
The court held that Twardosz’s interest in the selected route lacked those qualities. She did not allege that she lost her job, accepted a lower wage, lost other economic benefits, or suffered a specific hardship from the change. The complaint also indicated that she later selected and serviced a new route, suggesting that any deprivation was not permanent. The court found that her general allegations about difficulty obtaining raises or promotions were conclusory and did not establish a right to a promotion, a salary or benefits loss, or a connection between the selected route and a promotion opportunity. The court therefore dismissed the property-interest claim.
The court also addressed Twardosz’s stigma-plus claim. This type of claim requires allegations that the government made stigmatizing statements, made them public, and did so at the same time as the loss of employment or another legal right or status. The court held that Twardosz had not alleged the required public dissemination. The complaint did not allege that the statements were made to the public or to anyone seeking information about her. The email appeared to have been sent only to three First Mile recipients and one Yonkers Public School District recipient and appeared to be an internal communication. The court therefore dismissed the stigma-plus claim without reaching the defendants’ other arguments about whether the statements were sufficiently stigmatizing or whether Twardosz alleged a sufficient loss of employment or legal status.
Disposition
Judge Kenneth M. Karas granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because this was the first adjudication of Twardosz’s claims, the dismissal was without prejudice. The court allowed her to file an amended complaint within 30 days and stated that the amended complaint would replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint. The court warned that failure to meet the deadline could result in dismissal with prejudice. The Clerk was directed to terminate the pending motion.
Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.