Deutsch v. New York State Board of Elections

Background

The plaintiffs were twelve prospective United States voters residing in Israel who had never lived in the United States. They were children of United States citizens who had previously lived in New York. They sought to register for New York’s November 3, 2020 general election and to receive absentee ballots as overseas voters.

New York law required these applicants to submit their registration applications by October 9, 2020—25 days before the election. New York permitted overseas voters to submit Federal Post Card Applications by mail, fax, or email. For traditional-mail applications from other voters, the application had to be postmarked by October 9 and could be received by October 14. The plaintiffs argued that this five-day receipt period created unequal treatment because email applications arrive immediately and therefore had to be submitted by October 9.

Israel was under a mandatory lockdown from September 18 through October 18, 2020. The plaintiffs said they could not visit a post office, so they emailed their applications to county election boards between October 10 and October 14. Some applications were rejected and others received no response. The plaintiffs sued the New York State Board of Elections, named officials, and the Governor in their official capacities. They asserted First Amendment, equal-protection, vagueness, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, and requested declaratory relief, injunctions, absentee ballots, damages, fees, and costs.

Rulings on the Constitutional Claims

The court applied the Anderson-Burdick framework, which weighs the burden an election rule places on voting rights against the state’s interests. It held that the October 9 deadline was not a severe burden. The deadline merely required voters to submit a registration application approximately three and a half weeks before the election, and the plaintiffs did not show that the pandemic prevented them from emailing their applications by October 9. The court also found that the election authorities’ websites, read together with the statutes, identified October 9 as the relevant submission deadline.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge. It concluded that New York had a legitimate interest in orderly, fair, and efficient election administration and that the plaintiffs faced only a slight burden: completing and emailing a single form by the deadline. The court also rejected the equal-protection theory based on different treatment of email and traditional-mail applications. It held that all applicants had to submit applications by October 9; the later October 14 date applied only to the receipt of traditional-mail applications that had been timely postmarked.

The court separately rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that county election boards applied the deadline inconsistently. The evidence showed that one county board mistakenly processed a late application and later cancelled the registration, while other accounts of late processing involved unidentified individuals or attorney representations. The court held that this evidence would not allow a reasonable jury to find widespread or systematic unequal treatment.

Injunctions and Section 1983

The plaintiffs sought both preliminary and permanent injunctions. A preliminary injunction requires, among other things, a likelihood of success on the merits; a permanent injunction requires actual success. Because the plaintiffs did not succeed on their First Amendment and equal-protection claims, the court denied both forms of injunctive relief.

The plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims sought damages and fees based on the alleged constitutional violations. The court held that those claims failed because the plaintiffs had not established a violation of their voting or equal-protection rights.

Disposition and Unresolved Claim

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for temporary and permanent injunctive relief. It granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ First Amendment, equal-protection, and § 1983 claims. The opinion did not address the separate claim that the deadline was unconstitutionally vague because neither side briefed that issue or sought permission to brief it. The Clerk was directed to close the entries at Docket Nos. 3 and 28.