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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Nov. 9, 2020

Fishon v. Peloton Interactive, Inc.

Judge
Lorna Schofield
Docket
1:19-cv-11711
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
30
Motion to DismissCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Fishon v. Peloton, Judge Liman granted Peloton’s dismissal motion against Alicia Pearlman but denied it against Eric Fishon over its “ever-growing” library claims.

Who this affects

Eric Fishon’s New York consumer-protection claims against Peloton were allowed to proceed past the dismissal stage, while Alicia Pearlman’s claims were dismissed for lack of an adequately alleged connection between her transaction and New York. Peloton’s motion was denied as to Fishon and granted as to Pearlman.

What happened

In Fishon v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., Peloton challenged claims that its advertising falsely described its fitness-class library as “ever-growing.” The plaintiffs alleged that Peloton removed about 5,739 classes after a music-copyright lawsuit and should have disclosed the likely removals.

The court ruled that the advertising could reasonably mislead consumers, was a measurable factual claim rather than mere sales talk, and was not defeated by Peloton’s terms allowing content removal. The court also found that Fishon adequately alleged that he was harmed by receiving a smaller library than expected. Alicia Pearlman’s claims failed because she did not allege that any part of her transaction occurred in New York.

Judge Lewis J. Liman granted Peloton’s motion to dismiss as to Pearlman and denied it as to Fishon. The court also noted that Patrick Yang had voluntarily dismissed his claims without prejudice, making Peloton’s standing argument concerning Yang moot.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Fishon v. Peloton Interactive, Inc. · No. 1:19-cv-11711
Judge
Lorna Schofield
Date
Nov. 9, 2020

Background

Peloton sells stationary bicycles and treadmills that provide access to live and on-demand fitness classes through a separate monthly subscription. Its advertising described the class library as “ever-growing.” After receiving a cease-and-desist letter from the National Music Publishers Association and facing a lawsuit alleging unauthorized use of copyrighted music, Peloton removed approximately 5,739 classes—nearly 57% of the available library—from its on-demand collection.

Eric Fishon and other plaintiffs alleged that Peloton’s “ever-growing” description was deceptive and misleading. They alleged that they purchased Peloton products and subscriptions in reliance on that representation, and that the removal of classes and music diminished the value of the subscription. They also alleged that Peloton knew it was using music without the necessary rights and should have disclosed the likely removals earlier. The claims arose under Sections 349 and 350 of the New York General Business Law, which address deceptive business practices and false advertising.

Peloton moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not adequately state a legal claim. Peloton argued that its Terms of Service allowed it to remove content, that “ever-growing” was non-actionable puffery, that the statement was not misleading, and that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged causation, injury, or a sufficient connection to New York. Peloton also argued that Patrick Yang lacked constitutional standing, but Yang voluntarily dismissed his claims without prejudice while the motion was pending.

Court’s Analysis

Terms of Service. The Terms of Service reserved Peloton’s right to add, modify, or remove content and stated that particular content was not guaranteed to remain available. The court held that these provisions did not defeat the deceptive-marketing claims at the pleading stage. The terms addressed whether particular classes could remain available, but did not disclose that Peloton might remove more than half of its library without replacing those classes with enough new content. The court also noted that the removal language appeared in later fine print rather than prominently alongside the “ever-growing” advertising.

Puffery. The court rejected Peloton’s argument that “ever-growing” was puffery. Puffery consists of vague or exaggerated statements that cannot be proved true or false. The court held that “ever-growing” was an objective, measurable, and testable representation because consumers could understand it to mean that the library would increase in size. The library either grew or shrank, so the statement was not puffery as a matter of law.

Deception and causation. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged that a reasonable consumer could be misled. It reasoned that a consumer could understand “ever-growing” to mean that the overall library would continually increase, rather than merely that Peloton would keep adding new classes while removing a larger number of existing ones. Whether the statement was actually misleading was not appropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss.

The court also rejected Peloton’s argument that the plaintiffs had to specifically allege that they saw the advertisement. The complaint reproduced an example of the advertising and alleged that the plaintiffs relied on the “ever-growing” representation when purchasing Peloton products and subscriptions. The court held that these allegations were sufficient to support an inference of causation at this stage. It further stated that reliance is not an element of a private claim under either Section 349 or Section 350, although the plaintiffs still had to allege that they were injured because of the deceptive practice.

Injury. The plaintiffs alleged that they valued Peloton’s promise about the nature of the digital library and would not have purchased the products or subscriptions, or would not have purchased them on the same terms, had they known the truth. The court held that this was enough at the pleading stage. The alleged injury was that the plaintiffs received access to a smaller number of classes than they reasonably believed they would receive when they purchased the products. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs might face proof-related challenges later, but concluded that they had alleged enough to allow discovery to proceed.

Pearlman’s New York statutory standing. Peloton argued that Alicia Pearlman, whom the opinion identifies as a Michigan resident, had not alleged a sufficient connection between her transaction and New York. The court explained that New York’s consumer-protection statutes generally apply to transactions occurring in New York, not merely to deceptive conduct originating there or transactions involving a New York-based company.

Pearlman alleged that Peloton’s principal place of business was in New York and that the Terms of Service selected New York law and a New York forum and required notices to be sent to Peloton’s New York offices. The court held that those facts, by themselves, did not support an inference that Pearlman’s purchase occurred in New York. Pearlman did not allege that she purchased the product in New York, paid through an electronic or credit-card transaction accepted only in New York, or even identify the specific product she purchased. The court therefore dismissed her claims under Sections 349 and 350.

Disposition

The court granted Peloton’s motion to dismiss with respect to Alicia Pearlman and denied the motion with respect to Eric Fishon. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the motion docket entry. The opinion does not state that Fishon’s claims were finally resolved on the merits; it addresses only whether the complaint could proceed past the dismissal stage.

The authoritative version

Read the full 30-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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