Jordan v. Lamanna

Background

Gigi Jordan was serving an 18-year New York state prison sentence after a first-degree manslaughter conviction. In an earlier order, the court granted her petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal procedure for challenging a state conviction or custody. The court held that the state appellate court had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it rejected Jordan’s claim that closing the courtroom during part of her trial violated her Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.

The earlier order directed Amy Lamanna, the superintendent named as respondent, to release Jordan unless the New York County District Attorney notified the court that it intended to retry her within 90 days. The District Attorney appealed that order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and moved to stay, or pause, the order while the appeal proceeded. Jordan opposed the stay and cross-moved for release pending appeal.

Legal standards

The court applied Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 23(c), which generally presumes that a successful federal habeas petitioner will be released while an order granting relief is under review. It also applied four factors identified by the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Braunskill: the applicant’s likelihood of success on appeal, irreparable harm to the applicant without a stay, harm to other interested parties, and the public interest. The court also considered possible flight, danger to the public, and the state’s interest in continued custody and rehabilitation.

Analysis

The court found that the District Attorney had not shown a likely or substantial chance of success on appeal. The District Attorney did not identify a material factual or legal error in the earlier order or present a new argument demonstrating that the order should be reversed. The court also rejected the District Attorney’s suggestion that the appellate court might uphold the public-trial violation but require only that the closed portion of the proceeding be repeated. The court stated that the remedy identified in the earlier order was a new trial.

The court found no irreparable harm sufficient to justify a stay. It concluded that the time and resources involved in preparing for a possible retrial were ordinary litigation costs, and it modified the earlier order to defer the District Attorney’s obligation to notify the court of its retrial decision until after the Second Circuit ruled. The court also held that it retained authority to set release conditions while the appeal was pending.

The court determined that continued imprisonment would substantially harm Jordan. It cited her lengthy time in custody, the possibility that a new sentence could be shorter than the time already served, and her age and chronic asthma during the COVID-19 pandemic. The District Attorney did not argue that Jordan posed a danger to the public, and the court found that the public interest favored not continuing to imprison someone whose conviction was affected by a constitutional public-trial violation. The court also found that release conditions could address any flight risk.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the District Attorney’s Stay Motion. It modified the earlier order so that the District Attorney’s obligation to notify the court of an intent to retry Jordan would be deferred until 14 days after the Second Circuit issued its decision on the appeal. The court otherwise denied the Stay Motion.

The court granted in part and denied in part Jordan’s Release Motion. It granted the motion to the extent that Jordan would be transferred into federal custody for an interview by Pretrial Services and a bail hearing before the court in contemplation of release. It otherwise denied the Release Motion.

The contemplated release conditions included a $250,000 bond, three financially responsible co-signers, $100,000 in cash or property security, residence approved by Pretrial Services, electronic monitoring, geographic travel limits, drug testing, restrictions on weapons and criminal activity, and compliance with Pretrial Services. The court stayed the order for 14 days to permit the District Attorney to apply to the Second Circuit. If no such application was made, or if the application was denied, the court stated that it would lift the stay and issue the transfer writ.

Uncertainty noted

The opinion contains an internal chronology problem: its introduction says Jordan filed the petition on November 20, 2020, even though the order is dated November 12, 2020 and discusses events occurring before that date. This summary follows the order’s stated rulings and date.