Nypl v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.
- Lorna Schofield
- 1:15-cv-09300
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 2
Nypl v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.: Judge Schofield denied the plaintiffs’ motion to compel additional discovery as untimely.
The ruling affected the Nypl Plaintiffs’ request for additional discovery from UBS, Citigroup, Barclays, Bank of America, RBS, and HSBC.
What happened
In Nypl v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., the plaintiffs asked the court to require UBS and several other banks to provide information and witness cooperation that UBS had provided in a related foreign-exchange antitrust case. They relied on a 2017 order requiring defendants to produce certain documents from that case.
The plaintiffs also invoked a federal antitrust cooperation law, arguing that UBS had to provide broader cooperation because it was the leniency applicant in the related case. They said the defendants’ failure to provide the requested material had substantially harmed them.
The court treated the plaintiffs’ pre-motion letter as a motion to compel but denied it as untimely because fact discovery had closed and the court had permitted only limited additional discovery. Judge Lorna G. Schofield issued the ruling.
The detailed version
- Nypl v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. · No. 1:15-cv-09300
- Lorna Schofield
- Nov. 13, 2020
Background
The Nypl Plaintiffs submitted a pre-motion conference letter asking the court to compel UBS, Citigroup, Barclays, Bank of America, RBS, and HSBC to provide information and cooperation connected to the related foreign-exchange antitrust litigation. The plaintiffs relied on the court’s September 17, 2017, order requiring defendants to produce documents that had been produced to plaintiffs in that related case, except documents consisting of trade data.
The plaintiffs argued that UBS was the leniency applicant in the related case under the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act. That statute can reduce a leniency applicant’s potential damages liability when it provides satisfactory cooperation to civil claimants. The plaintiffs asserted that UBS’s required cooperation included information about the alleged conduct, relevant documents, and efforts to facilitate witness cooperation. They also alleged that the other banks had provided cooperation to the plaintiffs in the related case and should provide the same information here.
Motion and Ruling
The court construed the pre-motion letter as a motion to compel. The opinion states that fact discovery was scheduled to be completed by July 20, 2020, and that the court’s November 4, 2020, order permitted only limited fact discovery after that deadline. The court ruled that the request to compel production under the 2017 order, made more than three years after that order and after the fact-discovery deadline, was untimely. The court therefore denied the motion to compel as untimely.
Effect of the Ruling
The ruling concerned the timing of the discovery request. It did not decide whether the plaintiffs ultimately proved their antitrust claims or whether the requested information was otherwise required under the 2017 order or the cooperation statute.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.