Cook v. United States

Background

John William Cook, Jr. was tried in federal court after being charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and possessing a firearm in connection with the drug-trafficking and robbery offenses. A jury convicted him on the drug-conspiracy count and the firearm count, but he was acquitted on the Hobbs Act robbery-conspiracy count. The court sentenced him to 240 months in prison and five years of supervised release. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court denied review.

Cook then filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence. He primarily claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and a violation of due process at sentencing.

Ineffective-Assistance Claims

The court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington. Cook had to show both that his lawyer’s performance fell below reasonable professional standards and that the alleged errors probably affected the result.

Cook first argued that his lawyer should have challenged the indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(f), which requires an indictment to be returned in open court. The court found no evidence that this rule had been violated. It relied on the indictment’s date, signatures, filing information, the magistrate judge’s notation, and the public docket. Because the record did not show a violation, the court concluded that counsel was not ineffective for failing to make that motion and that Cook had not shown prejudice.

Cook next argued that counsel should have advised him to waive a jury and proceed with a trial based on stipulated facts so that he could receive a sentencing reduction for accepting responsibility. The court rejected the claim. It explained that choosing a bench trial, by itself, does not establish acceptance of responsibility. It also found no basis to conclude that counsel acted unreasonably by failing to recommend a stipulated-facts trial when Cook and counsel were contesting the government’s factual allegations. In addition, Cook did not show a reasonable probability that he would have received the reduction, particularly because he continued to dispute material facts.

Cook also claimed that counsel mishandled plea discussions and failed to explain his options and the risks of trial. The court relied on the record of an April 2014 pretrial conference, where Cook confirmed that he had discussed two government plea offers with counsel, understood the discussions, and rejected the offers. The court found that Cook’s later, unsupported statements did not overcome his sworn statements at the conference. It also found no prejudice because the sentencing ranges specified in the plea offers—262 to 327 months—were higher than the 240-month sentence the court ultimately imposed.

Finally, Cook raised additional allegations involving suppression of evidence, investigation and presentation of evidence, sentencing advocacy, and a conflict of interest. The court found these allegations conclusory and unsupported by facts. It concluded that Cook had not satisfied either part of the ineffective-assistance test.

Due-Process Sentencing Claim

Cook argued that the sentencing court violated the Fifth Amendment because it did not understand the range of sentencing discretion available under the law. He relied partly on Dean v. United States, but the court found that decision inapplicable because Cook had been acquitted of the predicate robbery count and the court was not sentencing him on that count. The court also found that the sentencing record showed that it calculated the applicable guideline range, recognized that the guidelines were advisory rather than binding, considered the statutory sentencing factors, and exercised its discretion in imposing the 240-month sentence.

Cook also relied on a Ninth Circuit decision concerning drug-quantity findings at sentencing. The court declined to follow that decision because binding Second Circuit precedent permitted a sentencing judge to find a drug amount greater than the amount found by the jury. The court therefore denied Cook’s due-process claim.

Disposition

Judge Alison J. Nathan denied Cook’s § 2255 petition. The court ruled that the case records conclusively showed that Cook was not entitled to relief, so it denied a hearing. The clerk was directed to close the civil docket and enter judgment. The court also declined to issue a certificate of appealability and denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees, finding that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.