Stanley v. CUNY, John Jay College
- Paul Engelmayer
- 1:18-cv-04844
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 5
In Stanley v. CUNY, Judge Nathan granted Stanley’s motion to set aside the judgment, vacated the dismissal, and reopened the case because of his lawyer’s conflict and inadequate representation.
David Stanley’s case was reopened, allowing him to file a second amended complaint; CUNY must continue defending the action, and former counsel Courtney Davy’s conflict and representation were central to the ruling.
What happened
In Stanley v. CUNY, David Stanley alleged that John Jay College discriminated against him because of a disability and retaliated after he complained. The court had previously dismissed his claims with prejudice. Stanley later asked the court to set aside that judgment, saying his former lawyer, Courtney Davy, had taken a job at John Jay College during the case without properly addressing the resulting conflict.
The court found that Davy had a serious conflict of interest and that his representation included substantial errors. Among other things, he did not identify the relevant provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act, did not sue state officers for possible injunctive relief, and did not respond to arguments against Stanley’s Rehabilitation Act claim. The court concluded that the conflict and the poor representation together created the exceptional circumstances required to set aside the judgment.
Judge Alison J. Nathan granted the motion under Rule 60(b)(6), vacated the judgment, reopened the case, and ordered Stanley to file a second amended complaint within 90 days. The court did not find that the defendant or its counsel committed fraud on the court.
The detailed version
- Stanley v. CUNY, John Jay College · No. 1:18-cv-04844
- Paul Engelmayer
- Nov. 19, 2020
Background
David Stanley sued his employer, City University of New York (CUNY), alleging disability discrimination and retaliation by John Jay College. The opinion states that John Jay College is not a legally separate entity from CUNY and therefore was not a properly named defendant. CUNY moved to dismiss, and the court dismissed Stanley’s claims with prejudice.
Stanley then moved for relief from that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), 60(b)(6), and 60(d)(3). He argued that his former lawyer, Courtney Davy, disclosed during the representation that he had begun working at John Jay College, the subject of the lawsuit. Stanley asserted that Davy did not properly inform him of the conflict and that Stanley never waived it. Davy disputed some of Stanley’s account but conceded that Stanley had not waived the conflict in writing as required by the New York Rules of Professional Conduct.
Court’s analysis
The court rejected Stanley’s argument that CUNY or its defense counsel had committed fraud on the court, finding no evidence of ethical violations by them. The court also stated that Davy’s conduct, although inconsistent with the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, was not properly characterized as fraud on the court.
The court granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6), which permits relief from a judgment for any other reason that justifies it. The court explained that this remedy is reserved for extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship, and that inadequate representation must involve more than gross negligence.
The court found that Davy had a serious conflict because he was employed by the opposing institution during the litigation. It also found substantial errors in his opposition to the motion to dismiss. Davy repeatedly failed to identify the provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act under which Stanley brought his employment-discrimination claims. He also failed to sue state officers, which the court said could have permitted an injunctive claim under that statute. In addition, although Stanley’s Rehabilitation Act claim was the only claim not barred by sovereign immunity, Davy did not respond to CUNY’s arguments about that claim, resulting in its dismissal as abandoned.
The court stated that the conflict and the poor quality of representation might not independently justify relief, but together they were sufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances. The court described Davy’s failure to defend the potentially meritorious damages claim as coming close to abandoning Stanley’s case. It concluded that the prejudice to CUNY from reopening the case was outweighed by the prejudice Stanley would suffer if he were denied a fair opportunity to pursue his claims.
Ruling
Judge Alison J. Nathan granted CUNY’s motion pursuant to Rule 60, specifically relying on Rule 60(b)(6). The Clerk was directed to vacate the judgment, reopen the case, and mail Stanley a copy of the order. Stanley was ordered to file a second amended complaint no later than 90 days from the date of the order.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.