Donnelly v. Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program Unit

Background

Patrick J. Donnelly applied for naturalization on September 14, 2009. Respondents did not schedule his initial hearing until 2014 and denied his application in 2015 based on his failure to identify his prior position as a company’s chief executive officer. Respondents affirmed that denial in 2016. Donnelly challenged the decision in a prior related proceeding, but the parties agreed to reopen his application, and he voluntarily dismissed that case.

After reopening the application, Respondents held another hearing on January 23, 2018, focusing on Donnelly’s criminal history in Ireland. Donnelly had previously described being questioned by Irish police during the period known as the Troubles, but he had not characterized the incident as an arrest. After the 2018 hearing, Respondents obtained or purported to obtain records from the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Respondents said the records showed four traffic infractions and a 1985 arrest under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1976.

Respondents denied Donnelly’s naturalization application on May 22, 2018. They also concluded that he had not properly obtained lawful permanent resident status because he had not disclosed the traffic infractions and the 1985 incident when he obtained that status. Donnelly appealed administratively. After Respondents did not schedule a hearing within the period Donnelly expected, he filed this case. Respondents later scheduled a hearing, but Donnelly declined to attend. On October 31, 2019, Respondents affirmed the denial and, within the following week, began removal proceedings.

Jurisdictional issue

Respondents moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s legal authority to hear a case. Respondents alternatively argued under Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns failure to state a legally sufficient claim, that the removal proceedings prevented the court from granting Donnelly’s naturalization application.

The court explained that 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) gives the Attorney General sole authority to naturalize people as U.S. citizens, subject to specific exceptions. Under § 1421(c), an applicant may seek district-court review after a final denial following a hearing before an immigration officer. Under § 1447(b), a district court may act when an initial decision is not made within 120 days after the naturalization examination or hearing.

Donnelly acknowledged that, when he filed the case, his circumstances did not satisfy either statutory exception. His denial was not yet final, and Respondents had already made an initial decision within 120 days after his hearing. He argued that the exhaustion requirement in § 1421(c) was a claims-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional requirement. A claims-processing rule governs the steps a party must follow to obtain review; a jurisdictional requirement limits the court’s legal power to hear the case.

The court agreed that the delays and the alleged problems with Respondents’ treatment of the Irish records and traffic infractions created circumstances that appeared to involve manifest injustice. The court also discussed Respondents’ alleged failure to provide Donnelly with the records on which the decision relied, despite a regulation requiring statutory eligibility determinations to be based on information disclosed to the applicant, unless the information is classified for national-security reasons.

The court nevertheless held that equitable concerns could not give it jurisdiction that Congress had not granted. It relied on binding Second Circuit precedent treating § 1421(c)’s exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional. Because Donnelly’s case did not fit the statutory exceptions when filed, the court concluded that it lacked authority to adjudicate it.

Donnelly’s additional arguments

Donnelly argued that the final administrative denial on October 31, 2019, later gave the court jurisdiction under § 1421(c). The court rejected that argument because § 1421(c) also requires a hearing before an immigration officer under § 1447(a), and Donnelly had declined to participate in the scheduled administrative hearing. The court further stated that even treating a later amended petition as a new petition would require disregarding the statute’s participation requirement.

Donnelly also argued that the court could decide claims other than the naturalization claim. The court rejected that argument because those claims concerned the same reasoning Respondents used to deny his application. The court said it had no greater authority to undo Respondents’ review of the application than to grant the application itself.

Disposition

The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss, directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion at Docket Number 42, and directed that the case be closed. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.