Lopes v. Westchester County

Background

Christopher Lopes, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Aramark Correctional Services, LLC, Westchester County, Commissioner Joseph K. Spano, Assistant Warden Francis Delgrosso, and Sergeant Martinez under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on conditions at the Westchester County Department of Correction.

Lopes alleged that, beginning July 25, 2018, he was served food containing mold, raw or undercooked meat, human hair, a used Band-Aid, hard plastic, old food, and leftovers. He alleged that he became sick and experienced nausea, diarrhea, stomach cramps, vomiting, headaches, shaking, blurred vision, dehydration, and fatigue. He also alleged that Martinez, Delgrosso, and Spano failed to accept or properly address his food-related grievances. Lopes further alleged that he was transferred to the Old Jail 1 East Unit and placed on keeplock, a more restrictive form of confinement, without a disciplinary hearing and because he complained about the food.

The County Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally sufficient claim. Lopes did not oppose the motion.

Claims Considered

The court interpreted the amended complaint as asserting seven claims under § 1983:

Court’s Reasoning

Personal involvement. The court held that Lopes did not plausibly allege that Spano, Delgrosso, or Martinez was personally involved in providing contaminated food. Lopes alleged that Martinez refused grievances and that Spano and Delgrosso knew about or directed the handling of food-related grievances, but he did not allege that these defendants participated in food preparation, created or allowed a food-related policy or custom, failed to remedy known food problems, or acted with deliberate indifference to his illness. The court therefore dismissed the claims based on the defendants’ alleged personal involvement.

Eighth Amendment food claim. The court explained that an inmate must allege both an objectively serious condition posing an unreasonable risk of serious harm and deliberate indifference by an official. It concluded that the symptoms Lopes described and his allegations about the food did not meet the required level of seriousness for an Eighth Amendment violation. The court dismissed this claim.

Grievance claim. The court held that inmates do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the processing of prison grievances. It therefore dismissed Lopes’s claim based on the alleged interference with his grievances.

First Amendment retaliation. The court recognized that prisoners may be protected from retaliation for petitioning the government. However, it held that Lopes did not provide enough facts connecting his complaints to his transfer to the Old Jail. He did not identify the complaint that supposedly led to the transfer, when it was made, or whether Martinez was responsible for the transfer decision. The court dismissed the retaliation claim as conclusory.

Equal Protection. The court held that Lopes did not allege membership in a protected class, identify similarly situated inmates who were treated differently, or provide facts showing intentional discrimination. It dismissed the Equal Protection claim.

Due process. The court held that Lopes did not allege enough facts to establish a protected liberty interest in his confinement conditions. He stated only that the Old Jail was more restrictive and that he was placed there pending a hearing, without describing the conditions in enough detail compared with ordinary prison conditions. The court also concluded that the substantive due-process claim duplicated the Equal Protection claim and dismissed both claims.

Municipal liability. A Monell claim requires facts showing that a county policy or custom caused a constitutional injury. The court held that Lopes could not establish such a policy or custom merely by describing his own experiences or referring generally to other lawsuits and grievances. He did not provide enough detail showing a widespread and consistent practice or a causal connection between a county policy and a constitutional violation. The court dismissed the Monell claim and the official-capacity claims against the individual County Defendants.

Disposition

Judge Kenneth M. Karas granted the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because the court described this as the second adjudication of Lopes’s claims, it dismissed the claims with prejudice. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion and mail Lopes a copy of the order. The opinion separately notes that the amended complaint’s claims against Aramark were dismissed in a separate order.