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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Dec. 4, 2020

Restoration Hardware, Inc. v. Lighting Design Wholesalers, Inc.

Judge
Lorna Schofield
Docket
1:17-cv-05553
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
13
Civil ProcedureIntellectual Property
In one sentence

In Restoration Hardware v. Lighting Design Wholesalers, Judge Schofield denied LDWI’s motion with prejudice and Mizrahi’s without prejudice.

Who this affects

LDWI’s default judgment remained in place, and its motion to vacate was denied with prejudice. Mizrahi’s motion to vacate was denied without prejudice, leaving him able to seek relief on other grounds by the deadline set by the court.

What happened

Restoration Hardware, Inc. v. Lighting Design Wholesalers, Inc. involved defendants’ request to undo a default judgment in a copyright and trademark case. The defendants argued that service on Alan Mizrahi was improper.

The court held that electronic service of the second amended complaint through email and Facebook was proper under the court’s earlier service order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). It also held that LDWI, which no longer existed, could not seek relief from the judgment.

Judge Lorna G. Schofield overruled the defendants’ objections and adopted the magistrate judge’s report, denying LDWI’s motion to vacate with prejudice and Mizrahi’s motion without prejudice to a renewed motion on other grounds.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Restoration Hardware, Inc. v. Lighting Design Wholesalers, Inc. · No. 1:17-cv-05553
Judge
Lorna Schofield
Date
Dec. 4, 2020

Background

Restoration Hardware, Inc. and RH US, LLC sued Lighting Design Wholesalers, Inc. (LDWI) and Alan Mizrahi. The claims included direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement; false designation of origin, trademark infringement, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act; and common-law trademark infringement and unfair competition.

The plaintiffs served LDWI through the New York Secretary of State. After unsuccessful attempts to serve Mizrahi at two addresses, the plaintiffs obtained an order allowing service by email and Facebook under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). The plaintiffs later served the second amended complaint using those methods. LDWI and Mizrahi did not answer, and the court entered a default judgment imposing $1,300,000 in statutory copyright damages, plus post-judgment interest, and permanently barring further violations of the intellectual property at issue.

LDWI and Mizrahi moved under Rules 55(c) and 60(b)(4) to vacate the default judgment, arguing that service was improper. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion. The defendants objected to that recommendation.

Rulings on Mizrahi’s objections

The court declined to consider Mizrahi’s new argument that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because that argument had not been presented to the magistrate judge. The court also noted that Mizrahi had agreed during a court conference not to raise a personal-jurisdiction challenge for purposes of the motion to vacate. The court explained that this agreement did not waive his separate argument that service was improper.

The court concluded that the earlier service order covered “all other pleadings,” including the second amended complaint, and authorized electronic service under Rule 4(f)(3). Rule 4(f)(3) permits court-ordered service on a foreign defendant by means not prohibited by an international agreement. The court held that this rule does not require a plaintiff to first try every other available method of international service.

The court found that the plaintiffs had made reasonable unsuccessful attempts to serve Mizrahi before seeking alternative service. It also held that Mizrahi had not identified an international agreement that prohibited the email and Facebook service used in November 2017. Austria was not then a party to the Hague Service Convention, and the court held that service did not have to comply with Austrian law under Rule 4(f)(3). The court therefore found no clear error in the magistrate judge’s conclusion that service was procedurally proper.

Ruling on LDWI

The court adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that LDWI was no longer an active entity. Because the court concluded that LDWI no longer existed and could not seek relief except for purposes of winding up its affairs, it denied LDWI’s motion to vacate the default judgment with prejudice.

Ruling on Mizrahi and disposition

The court emphasized the preference for deciding disputes on their merits and noted that Rule 60(b) provides several grounds for vacating a default judgment. Although Mizrahi’s motion based on a void judgment was unsuccessful, the court denied his motion without prejudice to his filing a new motion based on other Rule 60(b) grounds. The court directed him to file any renewed motion by December 15, 2020.

The objections were overruled, and the magistrate judge’s report was adopted except as otherwise stated. LDWI’s motion to vacate was denied with prejudice. Mizrahi’s motion to vacate was denied without prejudice to seeking relief on other grounds.

The authoritative version

Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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